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This study’s focus is censorship on film in Egypt from 1971 onwards; when the first 
sign of incorporating religion as a source of law appeared with the addition of article 
2, which states that “Islamic Shari’a is a main source of legislation.” Film is the most 
culturally powerful artistic medium in the Egyptian society due its mass consumption 
and has, from its point of introduction, served as a mirror into Egyptian politics and 
morality. Foucault’s mission of understanding how “subjectivity” forms and the 
power relations/modes that bring it about is a lens through which this project intends 
to examine the dynamic of artists, artistic material and their relationship to different 
power mechanisms in Egypt as they induce subjectivity. This study argues that the 
Egyptian state operates within a certain power dynamic that has allowed the freezing 
of a moral framework, which began in the 1970s. This framework began with a 
constitutional makeup that intended to and was successful in making a specific moral 
and religious ideal permanent, allowing it to permeate Egyptian society, and which 
can be traced through observing censorship of film. This dynamic has resulted in a 
peculiar reaction from artists and intellectuals, along with the public, who, holding on 
to a moral archetype that needs to be protected by the state, have accepted the concept 
of censorship to varying degrees, and have all at one point deemed it somehow 
necessary rather than revolted against it.  	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Introduction	  	  	  
The very notion of the state defining what constitutes art, and judging what is 
obscene, immoral or socially unacceptable within it, is one that has been 
philosophized, broken down and, in several instances, resolved by the law and society.  
One of the main access points in understanding a society’s ideas about itself, and what 
it deems immoral, obscene or valuable, is censorship on artistic material. 	  
The definition of a censor is “a person who examines books, movies, letters, 
etc., and removes things that are considered to be offensive, immoral, harmful to 
society, etc.”1 Censorship of artistic material has been widely practiced and employed 
by the state and other agencies throughout history for different political and 
ideological reasons.  States that are now considered to be relatively progressive in 
terms of censorship had to process legal cases and form a body of jurisprudence on the 
matter to reach this, arguably imperfect, stage. In the US, for instance, hundreds of 
books were banned because their content was considered obscene, starting from John 
Cleland’s Fanny Hill in 1749,2 to Voltaire’s critically hailed satire, Candide, in 1930,3 
to D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover, which “was the object of numerous 
obscenity trials in both the UK and the United States up into the 1960s.”4	  
The focus of this study is, specifically, censorship on film in Egypt from 1971 
onwards; when the first sign of incorporating religion as a source of law appeared 
with the addition of article 2, which states that “Islamic Shari’a is a main source of 
legislation.” One of the reasons for choosing film as a focus point in this project is the 
evolution of laws and regulations on such an influential and powerful medium.  Due 
to the wide reach of cinema and its high consumption among Egyptians, there 
stemmed a need for regulation to establish control over what can be viewed or 
expressed through film. The social makeup of the Egyptian state resulted in a 
fundamentally different dynamic from other models (such as the US, for instance) that 
preserved censorship in a different form and on a distinct pedestal. This dynamic 
shifted under different ruling systems, from King Farouk and British occupation, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 "Censor." Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 10 Mar. 2014. <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/censor>.	  2 Banned Books Online, available at: http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/banned-books.html.	  3 Id.	  4 Id.	  
	  	   2	  
their effects in Egyptian public life, to Gamal Abdel Nasser and the post-1952 
revolution era. However, there is continuity between the ideologies and social 
influences introduced in the 1970s under Sadat’s regime and the ones upheld by the 
most recent governments and social institutions. 	  
This paper focuses on analyzing censorship and its social and legal drivers 
from the 1970s onwards, in a way that this continuity can be traced and studied. The 
introduction of article 2 in the 1971 constitution has led to major changes in Egyptian 
jurisprudence, the interpretation of relevant social values and the individual rights 
associated with them. This will be analyzed throughout this paper, along with the 
peculiar dynamic the state holds with its subjects, which has led to the preservation of 
the concept of censorship. I use the word “subjects” in a Foucauldian sense, whereby 
this task of identifying with, developing and being oneself is what Foucault calls “care 
for the self,” and where he “defines our ‘subjectivity’ as what we make of ourselves 
when we do devote ourselves to taking care of ourselves.”5 The key problem to which 
Foucault devoted himself is an investigation into the historical ontology of the 
Western reason “of the constitutive relations between the operation of power relations, 
the production of knowledge, and ways of relating ethically to oneself and others.”6 
His mission of understanding how “subjectivity” forms and the power relations/modes 
that bring it about is a lens through which this project intends to examine the dynamic 
of artists, artistic material and their relationship to different power mechanisms in 
Egypt as they induce subjectivity. 	  
Through the abovementioned analysis, I argue that the Egyptian state operates 
within a certain power dynamic that has allowed the freezing of a moral framework, 
which began in the 1970s. This framework began with a constitutional makeup that 
intended to and was successful in making a specific moral and religious ideal 
permanent, allowing it to permeate Egyptian society, and which can be traced through 
observing censorship of film. This dynamic has resulted in a peculiar reaction from 
artists and intellectuals, along with the public, who, holding on to a moral archetype 
that needs to be protected by the state, have accepted the concept of censorship to 
varying degrees, and have all at one point deemed it somehow necessary rather than 
revolted against it. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 DIANNA TAYLOR, MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS, 128 (Acumen 2010) (2010). 	  6 Roger Deacon, Strategies of Governance Michel Foucault on Power, 92 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 113, 113-148 (1998).	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It is important to position this paper among the literature already written on the 
topic of film censorship in Egypt. The conclusions that have been drawn and the focus 
of existing critique are crucial for analyzing the framework and narratives surrounding 
censorship, in order to better explain the points made by this paper. However, that 
said, there is not an abundance of literature on the topic of censorship in Egypt, and 
the body of work that exists has largely chosen to dryly document laws or facts rather 
than analyze issues that would contextualize censorship. There are a number of key 
works that I will discuss, some for the relevance and significance of their authors to 
the film industry or the institutions of censorship, and others because of their 
contribution to archiving the history. A number of works help in cementing the 
arguments made by this paper and so are important to review. However, overall, the 
choice to review these particular works is both due to the scarcity of sources on the 
topic, and the aim of this paper to encompass almost all works relevant to the subject.  	  
In some key works, the existence of censorship is accepted as a necessary 
function of the state, but in a way in which its mechanisms and its motives are 
questioned. For instance, Amal Fouad Erian starts her book Sultat Al-Cinema, Sultat 
Al-Reqaba (Authority of Cinema, Authority of Censorship)7 with the fundamental 
question of whether censorship is in place to protect a political system, or if it 
genuinely exists for the purpose of protecting “authentic” creations.8 The idea of 
protecting good versus bad art is reflected throughout the critique of censorship. The 
author believes that the fundamental notion of protecting public morality is a 
legitimate and acceptable purpose in and of itself, but has a problem with its 
implementation and the genuineness of institutions carrying out that purpose. The 
same can be said about two other works: Al-Cinema Wa Al-Sulta (Cinema and Power) 
by Mohamed Salah Al-Din and Al-Reqaba ’Ala Al-Intag Al-Fikry (Censorship on 
Intellectual Production) by Hasna’ Mahgoub.9 Salah Al-Din’s book includes an 
introduction that asserts the inevitability of a clash between creativity and power.10 
The author sees this clash as a fact that will remain so long as art is created within a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7 AMAL ERIAN FOUAD, SULTAT AL-CINEMA… SULTAT AL-REQABA (Wekalat Al-Sahafa Al-Arabiya 
1999) (1999).	  8 Id. at 5.	  9 HASNA’ MAHGOUB, AL-RIQABA ‘ALA IL-INTAG IL-FIKRY FI MISR  37, (Al-Araby lil Nashr wal-Tawzi’ 
1998) (1998).	  10 MOHAMED SALAH AL-DIN, AL-CINEMA WAL-SULTA (Maktabit Madbuli 1996) (1996).	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society, given its natural power structures, and argues that only in a vacuum can this 
clash be avoided. 	  
The authors then continue to offer either a history of censorship, pinpointing 
when the practice began in Egypt with censoring prints and theater in the 19th century, 
or a case-by-case account of key incidents where film clashed with the authorities in 
an anecdotal fashion. Beyond the introduction, the books contain very little analysis, 
and are mostly historical breakdowns of the laws and decisions pertaining to 
censorship. In the aforementioned works, the opinions provided pertaining to the 
function and purpose of censorship are accepting of the process, and the authors’ 
questions revolve around its administration rather than its existence altogether. 	  
 Another approach taken by writers on the topic is pure and dry historical 
documentation of the laws or the practical evolution of the process. Writers such as 
Samir Farid, in his text Tareekh Al-Reqaba ’Ala Al-Cinema Fi Misr (History of Film 
Censorship in Egypt),11 do not attempt to adopt an opinion on the topic. The book is a 
historical account of film censorship beginning with its origins with theater and 
moving through key incidents of film censorship from the 1930s to 2001. Farid does 
not criticize censorship nor does he praise it; instead, he simply recounts the story. 
The author gives a detailed picture of the law and its social surroundings, from articles 
written for or against censorship by filmmakers and critics, to incidents where there 
was public outcry for or against the screening of certain films.	  
Following a similar path comes Mahmoud Ali’s book Ma’at ’Am Min Al-
Reqaba ’Ala Al-Cinema Fi Misr (One Hundred Years of Film Censorship in Egypt).12 
It is, also, a historical analysis of the law, from its inception to its current form, and of 
the structure of the institution of censorship. The author includes what he considers to 
be significant instances of censorship, for which he provides court cases, detailed 
reports with required edits from the Ministry of Culture, as well as concurrent 
opinions, to give a comprehensive depiction of the history of film censorship. The 
same author also provides us with a three-volume legal encyclopedia that contains 
comprehensive documentation of all legislation pertaining to the film industry. It is 
not, however, specifically about censorship and contains a few cases that could be 
relevant, but are not central to the literature on censorship. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 SAMIR FARID, TAREEKH AL-RIQABA ‘ALA AL-CINEMA FI MISR (Al-Maktab Al-Masry li Tawzi’ al-
Matbou’at 2002) (2002). 
12 MAHMOUD ALI, MA’AT ‘AM MIN AL-RIQABA ‘ALA AL-CINEMA AL-MISREYA 42 (Al-Magles Al-
‘A’la lil Thaqafa 2008) (2008). 	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After having presented the main works that constitute the literature on film 
censorship in Egypt, I would like to position this project among them to shed light on 
where it stands in terms of the discourse surrounding censorship. My project is not an 
attempt at documentation — I do not aim to provide an exhaustive description of the 
history of the institution or the notion of censorship, nor do I offer a comprehensive 
report of the laws pertaining to censorship. My paper, however, differs from the 
existing literature in that it acknowledges the presence of a documented history of the 
process, and moves on from this step into analysis. This paper attempts to analyze the 
power modes surrounding censorship, what drives it and what preserves its 
permanence. Rather than just look closely at the incidentals without providing an 
analysis of the drivers for censorship, it aims to examine the dynamic between the 
state and its subjects. In doing so, it attempts to provide a more abstract analysis of the 
notion of censorship and its place in Egyptian society in terms of law, the progression 
of art and its entanglement with religion and morality. 	  
In the first chapter, a brief history of the laws of censorship and its evolution to 
the form it currently takes is established. A breakdown of the different stages of 
censorship on film, from the very first stages to the final ones, is also provided, in 
order to paint a vivid picture of the criteria and standards the state upholds when 
judging artistic material. The chapter then gives an account of existing legislation on 
censorship, the constitutional texts and relevant jurisprudence that demonstrate the 
state’s stance and approach towards censorship, as well as the role of artistic material 
as exemplified by film. 	  
The second chapter provides the theoretical framework through which this 
paper analyzes the modes of power at work in relation to censorship. I adopt the 
Foucauldian model of bio-power to elucidate the overarching dynamic in which 
censorship operates in Egypt, and which also largely explains the jurisprudence, legal 
theory and societal reactions surrounding censorship. It also provides an explanation 
for the peculiarity of the Egyptian model, which will be juxtaposed with two other 
models (the Iranian and the American) at a later stage. This power model, as 
explained through Foucault, allows for an understanding Egypt’s particular model of 
constitutionalism, as well as how this model aids the preservation of censorship as a 
state function. 	  
Following this, the third chapter consists of a detailed analysis of Egyptian 
constitutionalism and the standard of public policy, which demonstrates the state’s 
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role as a moral agent, whose jurisdiction extends from religious freedoms to rights 
pertaining to artistic expression. The fourth and final chapter concludes with a 
comparison between the Egyptian model and the Iranian and American ones. It is a 
reiteration of the aforementioned point regarding the subsequent involvement of 
artists and intellectuals in complicity with the state, to preserve its role as an agent of 
morality. 	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I. History of Censorship and the Sources of the Law	  	  
There is a necessary distinction to be made within the laws that govern the 
broadcasting of film material, in that there are laws that regulate the logistics of 
screenings, such as the licensing of venues to screen films and the consequential 
penalties, and there are regulations that deal directly with the content of the artwork 
itself. Both forms are relevant to this project and will be discussed, however, I am 
more concerned with the latter form of regulation, which is censorship. In the first 
section, I will examine the existing legislation on censorship by which the bodies 
administering censorship on film operate and will trace the evolution of these bodies 
from the first introduction of the concept of censorship over artistic material to its 
current institutional form. This allows the reader to better understand the position of 
the concept of censorship from a legal and technical viewpoint before discussing the 
social and theoretical aspects of the concept. I will then go through the reinforcements 
of or limits on censorship through the most recent constitutions to present the general 
rhetoric of the state on censorship. 	  	  
A. Legislation on Censorship 	  	  
Under the rule of Khedive Ismail, theater bands and performances increased 
exponentially after the construction of the Cairo Opera House and other public 
theaters surrounding it in Ezbekeyya district.13 This is when theater as an art form 
began an intertwined relationship with Egyptian society and politics, and heavily 
influenced public opinion, specifically in regards to political issues concurrent with 
the flourishing of the Urabi revolt against the government and foreign interference.14 
The state then realized the importance of controlling content. Consequently, theater 
and publications fell under the auspices of state censorship, and the first law 
regulating printed material was pronounced in November 1881 (and was later 
amended to include supervision of film in 1904),15 to monitor newspapers and flyers 
with political content. Censorship was especially stringent on theaters, and hundreds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 FOUAD, supra note 7, at 30. 
14 Id. at 31. 
15 FARID, supra note 11, at 6.  
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of plays with negative religious or political connotations were subject to editing and 
banning. This process was mainly in the hands of the ruler, regardless of existing 
codification.16 In 1909, for example, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) banned a play that 
was based on the Denshawai incident.17 The incident that took place in the village of 
Denshawai,  in which a dispute erupted between British soldiers and Egyptian 
villagers that resulted in the shooting of an Egyptian woman and the summary 
executions of a few Egyptian villagers by the state, is considered a nationalistic 
turning point in the history of Egyptian resistance against British occupation.18 
Another example is the banning of a play (also by the MOI) entitled Shuhada’ Al-
Wattaniya (Martyrs of Patriotism), by Zaki Mabru,19 an Arabic adaptation of 
Victorian Sardou’s La Patrie, and the interception of the play Fi Sabil Al-Istiqlal (For 
the Sake of Independence) by Ibrahim Salim Al-Najjar. In such cases, the state 
arbitrarily censored or banned plays with content “capable of inflaming nationalist 
feelings.”20	  
The case did not differ with the introduction of film as a new form of 
expression. Film was first introduced to Egypt in January 1896, with the screening of 
the Lumière brothers’ first film in prestigious cafes around Alexandria. This was 
followed shortly by the introduction of film equipment and the dispatching of 
cameramen to Alexandria by the Lumière brothers to shoot material for their 
documentaries.21 European communities and Italian companies in Alexandria 
followed suit and started producing their own documentaries,22 which were simple 
moving photographs of events, and included little storytelling. 	  
Film remained practically outside the reach of censorship, as it was yet to have 
a large influence on the cultural scene that it does today. Regardless of the amount of 
influence this new form of art possessed, most laws regarding film, including the 
amendment of 1904, was to regulate theaters and screening venues in terms of 
permits, and penalties regarding disturbance of public order. Censorship of content 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Id. 
17 GAREEDAT WADI AL NIL, December 15, 1909, at 2. 
18 Kimberly Luke, Order or Justice: The Denshawai Incident and British Imperialism, 5 HISTORY 
COMPASS, 278 – 287 (2007).  
19 MOHAMED MUSTAFA BADAWI, EARLY ARABIC DRAMA, 66 (Cambridge University Press 1988) 
(1988). 
20 Id. 	  
21 FOUAD, supra note 7, at 11. 
22 The Early Years of Documentaries and Short Films in Egypt, available at  
 http://www.bibalex.org/alexcinema/films/Early_Films.html. 
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mostly applied to theatrical plays, where scripts were submitted for review long before 
the production came to life.23 This was based on a meeting in December 1909, when 
theater owners were warned by the state that no script could be acted out or viewed by 
an audience without it obtaining a license from the governorate beforehand.24 The list 
of regulations for theaters issued by the Ministry of Interior in July 1911, however, 
included some articles, such as article 10, that required the review of topics or 
“scenes” in films that could potentially disturb public morals.25 The article states that 
the police had the right to ban shows, and even shut down the theater, if “scenes, 
personifications or gatherings are against public morals and order.”26 However, the 
limited provisions relevant to the content of films could not be implemented in 
practice, as the programs of screenings changed at a very frequent pace on a daily 
basis.27	  
Attention to the content of film started by the end of World War I (WWI) 
when Al-Qesm Al-Fanny (The Art Department),28 under the auspices of the MOI, was 
created to censor film reels, which were categorized as publications. Publications also 
included newspapers, flyers and music records. A unified censorship law was enacted 
for a short period of time in 1928 on film and books, but eventually the 1881 and 1928 
laws on publications were regarded as obsolete and were abolished altogether in 
1931.29 Censorship then came under the auspices of the Ministry of Social Affairs 
(MSA) in 1936, when the ministry adopted the mission of promoting social values and 
elevating of the quality of artistic and media outlets.30 	  
This control over film by the MSA was short-lived, as censorship then moved 
back again under the jurisdiction of the MOI during World War II (WWII), and a 
number of ministerial decrees were issued between 1939 and 1944 to tighten control 
over media outlets and artworks. Censorship came specifically under the Office for 
Protecting Public Morals31 in the MOI, where one of its missions, as articulated by a 
ministerial decree that came out in 1940 to define its role, was supervision on cinema 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Id. 
24 Supra note 16. 
25 Id.	  
26Arabic Original:  تتاارتایيتلاا ةحئلا نم ةةرشاعلاا ةةدداملاا تحت  :ةیيلخاادلاا ةةررااززوو يف ينفلاا بتكملاا ووأأ رظظانملاا نم نناك ام ععونمم
ءاضتقلااا دنع وورتایيتلاا للافقإإ وو لیيبقلاا ااذھھھه نم نناك ام عنم يف قحلاا سیيلوبلل وو ببااددلااا وو مماظنلل ًافلاخم تتاعامتجلااا ووأأ ,صیيخشتلاا 
27 Id. 
28Arabic Original:  ينفلاا مسقلاا  
29 Tashreaat Database, available at: http://private.tashreaat.com/private/view_leg.aspx?id=287&flag=1. 
30 ALI, supra note 12, at 71. 
31Arabic Original:ةماعلاا ببااددلااا ةیيامح بتكم    
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and theater.32 There was a long feud between the two ministries over censorship, until 
another decree from the ministerial cabinet gave both ministries jurisdiction over 
regulation of artistic material, with the Ministry of Social Affairs taking the lead on 
issues related to censorship. In 1948, when the war in Palestine broke out, censorship 
was brought back under the jurisdiction of the MOI as a state of emergency was 
declared. 	  
With the 1952 revolution, and the new government that established itself after 
King Farouk, regulation of cinema and art was brought under the jurisdiction of the 
new Ministry of National Guidance, from within which the Ministry of Culture and 
Media (MOC) was created. This eventually broke off with its own separate role, 
which still includes film censorship to this day. The developments that came post-
1952 included change in legislation, as the first unified law on censorship was passed. 
In 1955, law no. 430 was enacted to include “film, theater plays, music, photographic 
slide projectors, monologues, music records and cassette tapes under state censorship, 
with the intention of protecting public morals and decency and preserving public order 
and the higher interests of the state.”33	  
Here, the state also took interest in the mental and moral development of the 
population and assumed the role of preserving social values. The law gave extensive 
power to the state over all forms of artistic expression, as it was the intention of the 
law to protect public decency along with public order, two abstract concepts that can 
only be defined circumstantially and by the state’s own apparatuses. There is also an 
explanatory memorandum34 annexed to the law to explain the legislature’s intentions 
behind the law. The commentary begins with iterating concern over the decline in 
public taste in music, monologues and films, and the task that the ministry took upon 
itself to elevate the quality of artistic output and to preserve the sanctity of familial 
values that are entrenched within Egyptian society.35 The law was later amended by 
law no. 38 of the year 1992, with more focus on copyright issues. For instance, article 
5 of the law now states that only the author of any given work has the right to “exploit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 ALI, supra note 12, at 73. 
33Arabic original: 	   ةةدداملاا	   	  نم	  ننوناق	     ،٬	      	  :عضخیي	  ةباقرر	  ةططرشلااا	  ةیيئامنیيسلاا	  وو	  تتاحول	  سسونافلاا	  ييرحسلاا	  وو	  
تتایيحرسملاا	  وو	  تتاجولونملاا	  وو	  يناغلااا	  وو	  ةططرشلااا	  ةیيتوصلاا	  وو	  تتانااوطسلااا	  وواا	  ام	  اھهلثامیي	  وو	  كلذذ	  دصقب	  ةیيامح	  ببااددلااا	  ةماعلاا	  وو	  ةظفاحملاا	  يلع	  
نملااا	  وو	  مماضنلاا	  مماعلاا	  وو	  حلاصم	  ةلوودلاا	  ایيلعلاا 	  
34Arabic original:	   ةةركذم	  ةیيحاضیياا 	  	  
35 MAHMOUD ALI, MAUSOO’AT AL-TASHRI’AT AL-CINEMA’EYA- AL-GOZ’ AL-THANI 132 (Al-Maglis 
Al-‘A’la lil Thaqafa 2010) (2010).  
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his/her product financially”36 and article 47 currently places a financial penalty or a 
prison sentence on whoever violates rights stipulated by previous articles, such as 
article 5.37 The 1992 amendments also widened the scope of law no. 430 and changed 
article 1 of the law to apply censorship over “audio and audio/visual products, 
whether it is a live performance, or recorded on a tape, CD or any other technological 
form of recording, with the purpose of protecting public order and morals and the 
higher interests of the state.”38 	  
Law no. 430 of 1955 was followed by ministerial decree no. 163 of the year 
1955, which issued a list of executive regulations for the law. These included 
regulations regarding which offices should be applied to for approval of a film script 
or how many copies are to be submitted. This list went through several amending 
ministerial decrees over the years, until it reached its current form in 1993, which is 
discussed in detail in the following section. 	  
 A number of subsequent ministerial decrees were issued to specialize the 
process of censorship, instead of it being carried out by a minor branch under the 
Ministry of National Guidance. The first of these is decree no. 91 of the year 1968 that 
established the Council of Censorship over Artistic Products,39 which was then 
expanded by ministerial decree no. 350 of the year 1970 to form the General 
Administration for Censorship over Artistic Material.40 This administration later came 
under the auspices of the new MOC, which was formed through decree no. 350 of the 
year 1972. Subsequently, the Central Administration for Censorship over Audio and 
Audio/Visual Products was formed and became the institution responsible for 
censorship of film, a role that that it still performs today. 41	  	  
B. Coming to Light: The Stages of Censorship	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Arabic original:   ةةدداملاا٥ ىلع للوصحلاا دعب لاإإ قحلاا ااذھھھه ةةرشابم ههریيغل ززوجیي لاوو ،ً٬ایيلام ھهفنصم لللاغتساا يف قحلاا ههدحوو ھهلوو :
نوو ةقیيرطط ننذذلإاا نمضتیيوو ،٬ھهئافلخ ووأأ يلصلأاا فنصملل يلاملاا لللاغتسلااا قح بحاص نم يباتك ننذذإإلللاغتسلااا ةةدموو ععو . 
37Arabic Original:   ةةدداملاا٤٧۷ ىىدحإب ووأأ ،٬ھهیينج ففلاآآ ةةرشع ىلع دیيزت لاوو ھهیينج ففلاآآ ةسمخ نع لقت لا ةماارغبوو سبحلاب بقاعیي :
لك نیيتبوقعلاا نیيتاھھھه  ةیيتلآاا للاعفلأاا دحأأ بكترراا نم:  
 : ددااوملاا يف اھهیيلع صصوصنملاا فلؤملاا ققوقح نم قح ىلع ىىدتعاا نم :ًلاووأأ5  وو6  وو7 ننوناقلاا ااذھھھه نم . 
38  رردداصلاا فلؤملاا قح ةیيامح ننوناق يف تتددرروو امنیيأأ (ةفاقثلاا ریيززوو) ةةررابع (ةیيمومعلاا ففرراعملاا ریيززوو) ةةررابعب للدبتسیي :ىلوولأاا ةةدداملاا
 مقرر ننوناقلاب354  ةنسل1954 ررابع (يموقلاا دداشررلإاا ةةررااززوو) وو (يموقلاا دداشررلإاا ریيززوو ) يتررابعب للدبتسیي امك .ھهل ةةذفنملاا تتاارراارقلااوو ات
 يناغلأااوو ييرحسلاا ننونافلاا تتاحولوو ةیيئامنیيسلاا ةططرشلأاا ىلع ةباقرلاا میيظنت ننوناق يف اتددرروو امنیيأأ (ةفاقثلاا ةةررااززوو) وو (ةفاقثلاا ریيززوو)
 مقرر يتوصلاا لیيجستلاا ةططرشأأوو تتانااوطسلأااوو تتاجولونملااوو تتایيحرسملااوو430  ةنسل1955 ھهل ةةذفنملاا تتاارراارقلااوو . 
39 Arabic Original: ىلع ةباقرلاا سلجم ةیينفلاا تتافنصملاا     
40 Arabic Original: ةیينفلاا تتافنصملاا ىلع ةباقرلل ةماعلاا ةةررااددلإاا    
41 Arabic original:  ةیينفلاا تتافنصملاا ىلع ةباقرلل ةیيزكرملاا ةةررااددلإاا  
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 The function of censorship over artistic products falls under the Supreme 
Council of Culture42 under the MOC.43 From this Council stems six administrations, 
only one of which is of concern to this paper: the Central Administration for 
Censorship over Audio and Audio/Visual Products (Central Administration for 
Censorship). The Central Administration for Censorship then branches out into three 
General Administrations,44 one regulating Arabic/foreign films, one regulating theater 
and music, and the final one regulating advertising material. The first one regulating 
film is divided into two specialized administrations: one specifically for Arabic 
language films, and the other is for foreign films. These administrations form 
randomly selected Committees,45 which consist of three employees who review each 
film, from the script-writing stage to the final product, and which change with each 
film. The Committees are selected from within the employees of the Administration, 
and there are no specific criteria in place for choosing them. The head of the Central 
Administration for Censorship has the authority to dissolve the Committee and form a 
new one if he/she does not approve of its report on the film it reviews.46 	  
Egyptian filmmakers are painfully aware of the tedious battle that awaits them 
with the Committee when they decide to embark on a new project. Even though it is 
not formally required, writers tend to preemptively submit a summary of their film, in 
order for the subject itself to be approved and to avoid the wasted effort of writing an 
entire script that may be rejected at face value.47 The summary of the film normally 
consists of a few pages that explain the general plotline, the characters and the issues 
that the film wishes to discuss or convey to the audience. In some instances, when the 
subject of the film is considered sensitive in terms of national security, the summary, 
or even the script itself, might have to pass through the scrutinizing eyes of state 
security or military intelligence to ensure the film does not pose any threat to the 
“higher interests of the state.” In these situations, it is the Committee that chooses to 
send the document to the specialized security bodies to free itself of the responsibility 
of an erroneous judgment on the matter.48 There are several cases to cite in this regard, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Arabic original:ةفاقثلل ىلعلأاا سلجملاا   
43 Interview with Ahmed Awad, Former Head of the Central Administration for Censorship. August 24, 
2014. 
44Arabic original:  ةماع تتاارراادداا  
45Arabic original: نناجل	  
46 Supra note 44. 
47 Interview with Medhat El Adl, script writer and producer. August 27, 2014. 
48 Id. 
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such as the recent conflict over the film Al-Ra’is Wal Mosheer (The President and the 
Field Marshal), which attempts to depict the controversial relationship between former 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Abdel Hakim Amer, his Minister of Defense.49 
Some scripts are also sent to Al-Azhar and the Coptic Orthodox Church to consider 
their opinion on matters related to religion.50	  
Naturally, a significant number of films get rejected on the basis of this very 
first stage every year.51 However, if the Committee (unofficially) approves a film’s 
summary, the filmmaker feels more at ease in continuing to write the script. The 
formal procedure begins when the writer submits the finished script, which is then 
reviewed by the Board to ensure that no changes need to be made before shooting 
begins. A written approval is attached to the script and sent back to the writer, with a 
list of amendments to the script required by the Committee attached.52 It is also 
clarified in writing that said approval is temporary until the final product itself is 
reviewed.53 The final product is assessed once again by the Committee, which is then 
entitled to request even more edits during post-production, and before the film comes 
out to be viewed by an audience. The Committee also reserves the right to ask for 
another screening until all edits are finalized and agreed upon by the different parties. 	  
Another potential obstacle still stands in the way of a film even if it has been 
showing for weeks in public theatres, namely article 9 of the law no. 430 of the year 
1955, which allows the Central Administration for Censorship to withdraw the permit 
for screening a film if, at any given point, circumstances arise that require it to do so.54 
The article states that “the authority responsible for censorship has the right to 
withdraw any of its prior decisions that previously provided a license to an artwork at 
any given point in time, if new circumstances arise that would require that it does so. 
In this case, it has the right to reissue the license after it administers what it sees fit in 
terms of additions, omissions or amendments without resulting in any fines.” This 
article practically deems any cinematic product to be artistically under the control of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Hal Yatahayal Gihaz Al-Riqaba ‘Ala Hukm Al-Idareya Al-‘Olya bi ‘igazat Taswir Film Al-Ra’is wal-
Mosheer (March 11, 2010), available at http://afteegypt.org/freedom_creativity/2010/03/11/84-
afteegypt.html. 
50 Supra note 48.	  
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54Arabic original:   ةةدداملاا٩۹ ااذذإإ تقوو ييأأ يف ههرراادصإإ قباسلاا صیيخرتلاا ببسم رراارقب بحست ننأأ ةباقرلاا ىلع ةمئاقلاا ةطلسلل ززوجیي :
 صیيخرتلاا ةةدداعإإ ةلاحلاا ههذھھھه يف اھهلوو كلذذ يعدتست ةةدیيدج ففوورظظ تتأأرطط ننوودد لیيدعت ووأأ ةفاضإإ ووأأ ففذح نم ههاارت ام ءاارجإإ دعب فنصملاب
مموسرر لیيصحت. 	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the Central Administration for Censorship at all times, from the moment of its 
inception to its ongoing screenings throughout the years. 	  
The reports of the Committee’s censors on the films they view are quite 
artistically invasive, as they decide on the order of the scenes, what is to be considered 
valuable to the artistic worth of the artwork and what should be taken out, if deemed 
unnecessary in terms of its dramatic placement. One example of the reports issued by 
the Board is its review of the film Al-Mozniboun, (The Sinners, 1976), where the film 
fell victim to article 9 of the law and its permit was withdrawn. The film is an 
adaptation of Naguib Mahfouz’s novel of the same title, and attempts to paint a 
picture of the corruption that was insidiously proliferating through Egyptian politics 
and social fiber. Seventeen weeks after it was first screened, and after winning five 
national awards, the Minister of Culture formed a committee55 of “intellectuals” and 
specialists to review the film. The film’s permit was then withdrawn, as it was 
perceived to be a work of defamation of Egypt that negatively affects the image of 
expatriate Egyptians and politicians, an act that is within the capacity of the minister, 
as the Central Administration for Censorship falls under his authority.56	  
Also among the measures that are within the authority of the Board, is the 
power to disallow the exportation of the film to specific countries. In this case, Al-
Mozniboun was not allowed to travel to any Arab state, including Sudan and Syria, 
before the newly required changes had been made. The Board issued an explanatory 
note detailing its reasons for withdrawing its approval of the film. The note included 
opinions that alluded to its support of artistic expression of any societal issue, but also 
rejected the commercial requirements that lead to frivolous works that only reflect a 
deleterious image of Egypt.57 Examples of the edits required to renew the film’s 
permit included the removal of any sexual innuendos through dialogue or gestures, 
such as a suggestive pose. Also, any reference that negatively depicted expatriate 
Egyptians living in Arab Gulf states was considered offensive, and was required to be 
cut out as a reaction to the uproar the film triggered within those expatriate 
communities.58 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 The committee consisted of prominent figures such as Yusuf Idris which is interesting to note in 
terms of the relationship between artists and state censorship and will be discussed in more detail at a 
later section.  
56 ALI, supra note 12, at 311.	  
57 Id., at 312. Arabic original:  ةجلاعم ىلإإ ًانایيحأأ ييددؤت ييرراجتلاا ركفلاا ةبلغ ننأأ لاإإ ،٬ععوضوم ييلأ ةیينفلاا ةجلاعملاا قح ركنن لا انناا
ةلدداع ریيغ ووأأ ةھهفات.  
58 Id. 
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Another interesting example of how far the Committee went with its required 
amendments is the report on the film Za’ir Al-Fagr (Visitor of the Dawn, 1973). The 
film’s concept was accepted by the Board, which deals with the rights to privacy and 
freedom of expression against the backdrop of 1971 Egypt. The Committee, however, 
had trouble passing the film as it thought its message was not clear enough, and that it 
delved too ambiguously into ideas that could be related back to the government, with 
insinuations that could be negatively interpreted. The Board then went on to suggest 
some changes to the structure of the film, the dialogue and even the genre.59 Additions 
were suggested, however, by some of the filmmakers to try and make the film more 
palatable to the Committee. For instance, producer and leading actress Magda Al-
Khatib wrote a letter to the Minister of Culture proposing changes, even adding a 
clarifying statement to the ending of the film so that no misinterpretation could occur 
regarding the film’s intentions, given that it was seen as perilous to “question the 
status quo” at that current moment: 	  
The age of injustice has ended on May 15th, and so has the era of the police state. 
Those who are honorable have come to light, and a new dawn is upon Egypt. 60	  	  
These invasive opinions and requirements undermine the artistic value of any 
artwork and completely neutralize the filmmaker’s idiosyncratic techniques and 
vision. It is also worth noting that there is no relevant criteria that regulates the 
selection of these censors. It is merely a bureaucratic process of appointment that 
depends on the ladder of employment at the Ministry of Culture.61 The only position 
that is considered more carefully during the selection process is that of the head of the 
Central Administration for Censorship. This post is usually granted to a credible 
intellectual that would give legitimacy to the Administration, as exemplified in the 
appointment of Ali Abu Shadi, a prominent and respected film critic, during the late 
1990s and until the early 2000s, and writer Naguib Mahfouz in the late 1960s. 	  
It is also noteworthy to understand the amount of freedom, or lack thereof, 
afforded to the censors on the Committee. The head of the Central Administration has 
the ultimate authority to pass or reject a film, but there are punitive mechanisms that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 ALI, supra note 35, at 358. Arabic original of some of the required edits: ١۱-  ظفحاا ىقب ينبیيستم" ةلمج ففذح
ةحفص .اھهعنمت ةباقرلااوو ةیيضقلاا ٥٠۰ 
٢۲-  .صص ههدعاسموو ققحملاا نیيب ررااوحلاا ففذح٤٠۰ قیيلیي لا يماازھهنإإ ررااوح وھهف   
60 Id., at 362. Arabic original:  يف ىىوقلاا زكاارم تھهتنااوو مملاظلاا دھهع ىھهتنإإ١۱٥  سسانلاا سفنتوو ویيام رصم ىلع ققرشأأوو ءاادعصلاا
دیيدج ممویي رجف. 
61 Supra note 44. 
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can be used against the censors or the head of the Central Administration, if they are 
seen as having erred in their judgment. In the previously mentioned case of Al-
Mozniboun, the censors — including the head of the Central Administration at the 
time, I’tidal Momtaz — were fined by the Supreme Disciplinary Court of the State 
Council, as a penalty for initially issuing a permit to a film that caused such an uproar 
and was deemed morally questionable in relation to society’s values and perceptions 
of decency.62 This act of approval was considered a betrayal to their nationalistic role 
of protecting public morals. 	  
A Grievances Committee exists within the ministry as a channel for 
filmmakers to petition the decisions of the Committee. The binding nature of the 
Grievances Committee’s decisions was challenged by the Central Administration for 
Censorship but was then affirmed in the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision in 
1991 regarding the film Darb Al-Hawa. In this instance, the court deemed the 
Grievances Committee a governmental body with a judicial appellate role, rendering 
its decisions binding, as opposed to the Central Administration’s earlier claim that the 
committee’s decisions are of a merely consultative nature.63	  
As for the guidelines for judging content, a list of executive regulations, which 
was mentioned earlier, is the current reference used by the Committee to this day.64 
The list was issued by the Egyptian Cabinet as decision no. 162 of the year 1993, and 
contains instructions that pertain to the duties of the Committee, including, for 
example, the need to provide the applicant (for the permit to screen his/her work) with 
written reasons for rejection.65 The list also contains four types of content that are not 
permissible under any circumstances, according to article 8: 	  
1. Promoting atheism or offending the three monotheistic religions: 
Islam, Christianity and Judaism.  
2. Depiction of sinful acts in a way that would encourage their practice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 ALI, supra note 35, at 319.	  
63 Id. at 337. 
64 Supra note 44. 
65 Cabinet Decision 162/1993, available at http://goo.gl/AgYF7y. Arabic original:  
 ھهجوو ىلع ززوجیي لاوو:ةیيتلآاا رروملأاا نم ًاارمأأ نمضت ااذذإإ فنصم ييأب صیيخرتلاا صصوصخلاا  
1 - .ةیيووامسلاا ننایيددلأاب ضیيرعتلااوو ةیيدداحللإاا تتااوعدلاا  
2 - .اھهیيلعاف ةةاكاحم ىلع عجشیي وحن ىلع تتاارردخملاا يططاعت ووأأ ةلیيذذرلاا للامعأأ ضضرع ووأأ ریيوصت  
3 -  تتاارراشلإااوو تتااررابعلااوو ءایيحلاا ششدخیي اموو ةةریيثملاا ةیيسنجلاا دھھھهاشملاا.ةئیيذبلاا  
4 - .ممرجملاا ىلع ةلوطبلاا نم ةلاھھھه يفضت ووأأ دیيلقتلاب ييرغت ووأأ فطعلاا ریيثت ةقیيرطب ةمیيرجلاا ضضرع  	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3. Explicit sex scenes or anything that could offend modesty, such as 
profane language or gestures.  
4. Depiction of crime in a way that would garner sympathy for the 
criminal, encourage imitation or portray him/her as a hero.  	  
The Board then judges a work based on these criteria and automatically requires 
editing out any of the above content, regardless of its use for the film as a whole. 	  
This concludes the formal process of censorship by the appointed body, and 
details the technical stages a film has to go through in order to be screened. It is 
imperative to understand the judicial trajectory of issues related to censorship on film, 
as this reflects not only the state’s view, but also that of the different societal factions 
on the value of censorship and art in general.	  	  
C. The Constitution on Censorship 	  
 
A question that has accompanied this project from its inception is the relevance of 
constitutional jurisprudence to ideas related to censorship. In other words, have our 
constitutions and courts aided, justified or battled censorship? One would assume the 
very concept of censorship had already been processed and dealt with in the Supreme 
Constitutional Court (SCC), given the nature of the question and how it is 
conceptually in opposition to several constitutionally guaranteed rights. However, the 
question of the constitutionality of law no. 430 of 1955 never actually reached the 
SCC. Cases related to censorship that were dealt with by the SCC have had very little 
to do discussing the abstract and general legitimacy of the concept of censorship, and 
will be examined shortly. Before doing so, however, an examination of the 
constitutional articles that are directly relevant to censorship must be conducted in 
order to answer the question of the law’s constitutionality. 	  	  
1. Constitutional Texts 	  	  
Egyptian constitutions have always formally guaranteed the right to freedom of 
expression, “within the parameters of the law.” Unlike the US or the UK, there is no 
differentiation between artistic or obscene material and no form of expression is 
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practically protected by the constitution from different practices and institutions of 
censorship, up until the 2014 amendments of the 2013 constitution. To take the 1971 
constitution as an example, freedom of expression and opinion is mentioned in general 
without specific reference to artistic material, and no case law seems to indicate that 
articles guaranteeing freedom of expression specifically protect artistic material. 
Article 47 states that “freedom of opinion is guaranteed. Every individual has the right 
to express his/her opinion and to disseminate it verbally, in writing, illustration or by 
other means within the limits of the law. Self-criticism and constructive criticism is a 
guarantee for the safety of the national structure.”66	  
 The parameters of the law have always been used throughout Egypt’s 
constitutions to linguistically implement limits to freedoms. The language of all 
constitutions has put freedom of expression — which artistic creations are categorized 
under — within the framework of, but not constitutionally above, changeable 
legislation. In article 48, “freedom of the press, printing, publication and mass media 
shall be guaranteed. Censorship on newspapers is forbidden. Warning, suspension or 
abolition of newspapers by administrative means is prohibited. However, in case of a  
declared state of emergency or in time of war, limited censorship may be imposed on 
newspapers, publications and mass media in matters related to public safety or for 
purposes of national security in accordance with the law.”67 Censorship on 
newspapers, specifically, is expressly forbidden. The assumption is that the 1971 
constitution attempted to leave space for outlets of expression related mostly to 
political matters, which, as prophesized by the following part of the article, was 
practically void after emergency law legislation was reenacted in 1981. 	  
Censorship of other forms of expression, which could affect the moral makeup 
of society, was never forbidden or viewed in a negative light. The 2013 amended 
constitution, however, is more specific in its clear reference to artistic material and its 
protection from censorship. Article 67, which is titled “artistic and literary creation,” 
is a largely altered approach from the complete absence of reference to artistic 
material in previous constitutions:68	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 EGY CONST. 1971, art. 47. Trans. available at 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=208#.Ux3VfBlVTbg. 
67 Id. at art. 48.	  
68 EGY CONST. 2013, art. 67. Trans. available at 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/20131206EgyptConstitution_Dec.pdf.pdf. 
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Freedom of artistic and literary creation is guaranteed. The state shall 
undertake to promote art and literature, sponsor creators and protect their 
creations, and provide the necessary means of encouragement to achieve 
this end. 	  	  
The article asserts the state’s role in promoting a social virtue, namely artistic and 
literary creation. It views art as a functional part of society that needs to be 
encouraged and protected, in a way where the state is taking interest in the mental 
wellbeing and development of the population. There are other factors to be considered 
in terms of intentionality, however, such as the need to stand in the face of Islamic 
movements in reaction to the recent clashes between the state and Islamists. There has 
been pressure from intellectuals on the state to show signs progressiveness in terms of 
art to prove that it is against the Islamization of the state. 	  	  
The second part of the article discusses the legal trajectory of censorship, and 
stipulates who can practice it over artistic material. The article reserves this right to 
the state and removes the mechanisms by which the public can bring a case against an 
artistic product:	  	  
No lawsuits may be initiated or filed to suspend or confiscate any artistic, 
literary, or intellectual work, or against their creators except through the 
public prosecution. No punishments of custodial sanction may be 
imposed for crimes committed because of the public nature of the artistic, 
literary or intellectual product. 	  	  
Public prosecution is the only route for a case to be brought against the content of an 
artistic product, and no artist should face a custodial penalty as a result of showing 
content that the court deems as inappropriate for public viewing. It is interesting to 
note the similarity between this article and the state’s decision on the once existent 
and functional “hisba” law, law no. 3 of 1996, which allowed for any citizen to bring 
cases against individuals in relation to personal status law. This law has been used 
against intellectuals and writers to censor and confiscate their work, whereby it allows 
citizens to file charges of apostasy and blasphemy against other citizens. The most 
prominent hisba-related case was the Court of Cassation ruling that deemed Nasr 
Hamid Abu Zayd an apostate in 1996, in reaction to his work on hermeneutics and the 
Qur’an. Intellectuals and artists have long called for the abolishment of the hisba law, 
as it gives power to certain ideas over others, and confines them to the boundaries of 
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decency and religiosity, which are decided on by the state.69 Hisba law was then 
amended after the Abu Zayd case to limit cases only to those brought through the 
public prosecutor, and not through individual citizens that have no standing.70  The 
most recent constitution then removes the same mechanisms that enable citizens to 
fight artists on the value of their work. This article can be interpreted as the state 
showing support for the arts, in the sense that it is limiting arbitrary and extremist 
claims that could weaken the potential of art. However, in doing so, the state is 
reserving for itself all the mechanisms of censorship. In this way, it has the final say 
on the value of the artwork, and its practices of censorship are also quite arbitrary and 
demanding.  	  
The last part of the article specifies that incitement to violence and 
discrimination will not be considered among the protected content of any artistic 
product, which implies that an artist can face any type of penalty, even custodial 
sanctions, as later defined by the parameters of the law:	  	  
The law shall specify the penalties for crimes related to the incitement of 
violence, discrimination between citizens, or impugning the honor of 
individuals. In such cases, the court may force the sentenced to pay 
punitive compensation to the party aggrieved by the crime, in addition to 
the original compensations due to him for the damages it caused him. All 
the foregoing takes place in accordance with the law. 	  	  
In terms of constitutional text, the legal mechanisms of censorship have been 
solely granted to the state, and what the state decides should be worth the process of 
examining for censorship. 	  
 As mentioned earlier, the cases that do reach the constitutional court have little 
to do with the constitutionality of the law on censorship, and more to do with 
regulatory articles, such as case no. 42 of the constitutional judicial year 19, which 
was decided upon on the 7th of February, 1998.71 The case revolved around the 
constitutionality of article 15 of law no. 430, which stipulates a penalty of no less than 
EGP5,000 and no more than EGP10,000 and/or a prison sentence of no more than two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Thawrat Al-Mothaqafeen ‘Ala “Tugar Al-Hisba” Tafdah Tawato’ Al-Hukuma Ma’a Al-Tayarat Al- 
Rag’eya, AL- YOUM AL-SABI’ (14 May 2010), available at 
http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=226086. 
70 Mauritis S. Berger, Apostasy and Public Policy in Contemporary Egypt: An Evaluation of Recent 
Cases from Egypt's Highest Courts, 25 HUM RIGHTS QUART 720, 722 (2003).	  
71 The official gazette, 19 February 1998, issue 8. 
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years upon the violation of article 2 of the same law.72 Article 2 deemed illegal any of 
the following acts73: 	  
1. Unauthorized recording or filming of an art product with the intention of 
commercial exploitation. 
2. Unauthorized performance, screening or broadcasting of an art product.  
The part in article 15 that is in question is the fact that the financial penalty cannot be 
suspended, which was eventually deemed by the Constitutional Court as 
unconstitutional.	  
 There seems to be more jurisprudential focus on regulatory articles rather than 
the very concept of censorship, and this focus is also reflected in what the public and 
filmmakers deem worthy of questioning and bringing to the court. If anything, there 
are cases brought to the court by the public calling for more stringent censorship 
which led to the aforementioned constitutional amendments of article 67 (refer to page 
27).	  
 There is the self-evident question about the public’s sentiments toward 
censorship on film. What is meant by the public here is those factions of society that 
fall between the state or individuals that make up the state, and the bloc of 
filmmakers, artists or intellectuals that are naturally expected to have opinions and 
reactions on the role and limits of censorship. There are no indications that there is 
strong opposition to the concept of censorship, or even a strong dialogue about the 
issue. There seems to be an acceptance of the concept, and even a call for a more 
focused direction on the part of the Board in what it chooses to censor. These 
reflections on the trends of censorship, and the type of content that is perceived as 
offensive or obscene, differ from one socio-economic level to another. The normal 
trajectory for citizens attempting to influence decisions made by the state on the 
content of film was through claims brought before the Administrative Courts. 	  	  
2. The Case of Bahib Al-Cima	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Arabic original:  ةةدداملاا١۱٥ رھهش نع لقت لا ةةدم سبحلاب صیيخرت ننوودب لللاغتسلإاا دصقب ًایيئامنیيس ًاطیيرش رروص نم لك بقاعیي :
لاا نیيتاھھھه ىىدحإب ووأأ ھهیينج ةئامسمخ ىلع دیيزت لاوو ھهیينج يتأم نع لقت لا ةماارغبوو رھهشأأ ةتس نع دیيزت لاوونیيتبوقع . 
73 Arabic original:  
 ةةددام٢۲يموقلاا دداشررلااا ةةررااززوو نم صیيخرت ریيغب ززوجیي لا : : 
 ًلاووأأ	  :ریيوصت	  ةططرشلأاا	  ةیيئامنیيسلاا	  دصقب	  لللاغتسلااا .	  
 ً ایيناث	  :لیيجست	  تتایيحرسملاا	  ووأأ	  يناغلأاا	  ووأأ	  تتاجولونوملاا	  ووأأ	  ام	  اھهلثامیي	  دصقب	  لللاغتسلااا .	  
 ً اثلاث	  :ضضرع	  ةططرشلأاا	  ةیيئامنیيسلاا	  ووأأ	  تتاحول	  سسونافلاا	  ييرحسلاا	  ووأأ	  ام	  اھهلثامیي	  يف	  نناكم	  مماع .	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One prominent example of this situation would be the case of Bahib Al-Cima (I Love 
Cinema, 2004),74 where seven Coptic citizens brought claims before the court 
regarding the film’s allegedly offensive depiction of the Egyptian Coptic community. 
The claimants saw that the film was deliberately conveying a negative image of the 
Egyptian Christian community and intentionally excluding some denominations of the 
Christian faith that exist in Egypt to give a distorted image of the Christian 
demographic. They also had problems with the depiction of the main character as a 
prim Christian with extremist ideas that, the film implies, led to his wife committing 
adultery. They believe the film should portray Christianity in its normalcy and in 
moderation, arguing that the film’s message, as it stands, is ambiguous and does not 
reflect well on their faith. The idea of a film or an artwork depicting an unfiltered, 
harsh reality, an anomaly or a state of extremism without necessarily having a moral 
message to convey is not conceivable to many, including the state, which still judges 
artistic products based on their moral value. The court goes on to defend the film and 
its value as a portrayal of an Egyptian family against a backdrop of significant 
political, social and economic issues, where all elements of the film come together 
perfectly to deliver the meaning intended by the filmmakers. It supports the decision 
of the Board in letting such a valuable project come to light, and eventually rejects the 
claims brought against the film. Similar claims appeared continuously against artistic 
products in all their forms, and, as mentioned in a previous section, the most recent 
constitution of 2013 has closed the door on this mechanism, a step perceived as 
victorious by the artistic and intellectual communities. 	  	  
3. The Case of Darb Al-Hawa	  
 
The SCC has never formally answered the question of the constitutionality of the law 
no. 430 of 1955. However, other court cases give us an idea of how the law is argued 
to be constitutional. Firstly, the most recent constitutional texts do not at any point 
protect artworks from censorship. However, articles that guarantee the right to 
freedom of expression can be used to back up a claim about the unconstitutionality of 
the law. 	  
 There are, nevertheless, other articles that strongly limit freedoms provided by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Mahkamat Al- Qada’ Al- Idary, Case no. 26899 of Judicial Year 58, available at 
http://qadaya.net/?p=4476. 
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the constitution. In appeal no. 1007 for the judicial year 32 (1991), the Supreme 
Administrative Court (SAC) heard the case for the film Darb Al-Hawa (The Road of 
Love, 1983)75 whose permit was withdrawn on the 24th of August, 1983, after a few 
weeks of screening and it garnering hostile reactions from the public and some 
members of the filmmaking industry. The SAC decided specifically on the question of 
whether the decisions of the Grievances Committee were binding to the Board, as it 
had prescribed some edits to be made to the film to allow the renewal of its screening 
permit, instead of banning it permanently. The SAC decided in favor of the 
Grievances Committee, as referenced in an earlier section, and deemed its decisions 
binding on the Board. 	  
 The relevant section of the SAC’s decision to the current question, however, 
was the SAC’s citation of constitutional law regarding the practices of censorship and 
its importance as a socially indispensable institution. The SAC goes on to cite article 
47 of the 1971 constitution on freedom of expression, and the full guarantee of the 
right of any individual to practice that freedom through any form of media he/she 
chooses. It also acknowledges the state’s obligations toward the international 
community as per its signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
provisions of which have become binding customary law, and include the duty of the 
state to guarantee the right to freedom of expression.	  
 Immediately after citing article 47, followed by a lengthy acclaim for the 
sanctity of the rights it iterates, the SAC mentioned that there exist limits to the right 
to freedom of expression that the constitution provides. These limits are embodied by 
the “provisions” of the constitution, which take the form of article 2 of the constitution 
that states that the principles of Islamic Shari’a are the main source of legislation. 
Even though article 47 is also a constitutional provision, the SAC seems to be 
reaffirming the priority article 2 takes over other constitutional provisions, by virtue of 
the textual powers given to it as a source of all legislation. The SAC also mentions 
article 9 of the constitution76: 	  
The family is the basis of the society and is founded on religion, morality and 
patriotism. The State is keen to preserve the genuine character of the Egyptian family-
together with the values and traditions it embodies-while affirming and developing this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Annexed 
76 Arabic original: ةةدداملاا ٩۹:  
ةیينططولااوو ققلاخلأااوو نیيدلاا اھهمااوق ،٬عمتجملاا سساسأأ ةةرسلأاا. 
 ىلع ةلوودلاا صصرحتوو يف ھهتیيمنتوو عباطلاا ااذھھھه دیيكأت عم ،٬دیيلاقتوو میيق نم ھهیيف لثمتیي اموو ةیيرصملاا ةةرسلأل لیيصلأاا عباطلاا ىلع ظظافحلاا
ييرصملاا عمتجملاا لخاادد تتاقلاعلاا 
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character in the relations within the Egyptian society.77	  	  
This is followed by articles 1078 and 1279 respectively:	  
The State shall guarantee the protection of motherhood and childhood, take care of 
children and youth and provide suitable conditions for the development of their 
talents.	  
Society shall be committed to safeguarding and protecting morals, promoting genuine 
Egyptian traditions. It shall give due consideration, within the limits of law, to high 
standards of religious education, moral and national values, historical heritage of the 
people, scientific facts and public morality. The State is committed to abiding by 
these principles and promoting them.80	  
The state takes it upon itself to preserve a certain conception of morality that it seems 
to believe is a permanent and unchanging feature of Egyptian society. Hence, it 
contributes to its permanent status, by enforcing strict practices to preserve this notion 
of morality in the face of any societal change or intellectual movements which it 
deems as alien to whatever culture it decides is Egyptian. 	  
The SAC then explained how the legislature provides freedom in terms of 
cinematic creativity, but limits it within parameters drawn by the law. These 
parameters are “the protection of public morals, the preservation of peace and public 
order and the higher interests of the state. This will mean that any artistic product 
deviating from these confinements is considered outside of the principal political, 
economic, social and moral elements that are protected by the constitution, which 
always transcend, in terms of priority and worthiness of the state’s protection, those 
requirements demanded by individual freedoms.”81 The SAC concluded this statement 
by requiring individual citizens to strive for protecting the public and collective good 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Supra note 67. 
78 Arabic original: ةةدداملاا ١۱٠۰:  
نملاا ففوورظلاا مھهل رفوتوو ،٬ببابشلااوو ءشنلاا ىعرتوو ،٬ةلوفطلااوو ةموملأاا ةیيامح ةلوودلاا لفكتھهتاكلم ةیيمنتل ةبسام . 
79 Arabic original: ةةدداملاا ١۱٢۲:  
 میيقلااوو ةیينیيدلاا ةیيبرتلل عیيفرلاا ىىوتسملاا ةةاعاارم ھهیيلعوو ،٬ةلیيصلأاا ةیيرصملاا دیيلاقتلل نیيكمتلااوو ،٬اھهتیيامحوو ققلاخلأاا ةیياعرب عمتجملاا ممزتلیي
 ،٬يكاارتشلااا ككولسلااوو ،٬ةیيملعلاا قئاقحلااوو ،٬بعشلل يخیيرراتلاا ثثاارتلااوو ،٬ةیينططولااوو ةیيقلخلااننوناقلاا ددوودح يف كلذذوو ،٬ةماعلاا ببااددلآااوو . 
اھهل نیيكمتلااوو ئئددابملاا ههذھھھه ععابتاب ةلوودلاا ممزتلتوو.	  
80 Supra note 67. 
81 Arabic original:   ىلإإ ،٬يئامنیيسلاا نفلاا للاجم يف ينفلاا ععاادبلااا ةیيرح قلططأأ دق ععرشملاا ننأأ ينوناقلاا میيظنتلاا ااذھھھه ييددؤم ننإإ ثیيح نموو
 اھهنیيب ددوودحب ققلاططلااا ااذھھھه دیيق ھهنأأ حلاصموو ،٬مماعلاا مماظنلااوو ،٬نملأاا ىلع ةظفاحملااوو ،٬ةماعلاا ببددلأاا ةیيامح يھھھه رصحلاا لیيبس ىلع ننوناقلاا
 ووأأ ةیيعامتجلااا ووأأ ةیيدداصتقلإاا ةیيساسلأاا تتاموقملاا نع ًاجرراخ دع ددوودحلاا ههذھھھه دحأأ نع يئامنیيسلاا فنصملاا ججرخ ام ااذذإإ ثیيحب .ایيلعلاا ةلوودلاا
 رروتسدلاا اھهیيمحیي يتلاا ةیيسایيسلاا ووأأ ةیيقلاخلأاا ،٬ةصاخلاا ةیيددرفلاا ةیيرحلاا ھهبلطتت ام ىلع ةیيامحلااوو ةیياعرلاا للاجم يف ًامئاادد ومستوو ولعت يتلااوو
 يتلاا ةماعلاا حلااوصلااوو تتایياغلاا قیيقحتل دداارفلأاا نم ةةرضحتملاا للوودلاا اھهیيلع مموقت يتلاا ةماعلاا ةیيسیيئرلاا ئئددابملاا نم ھهنأأ يف كش لا ذذاا
طلسلاا مماارتحإإ ببوجوو ةلوودلاا میيلقإإ ققاطن يف اھهنوفدھهتسیيضضرراعت دجوو ااذذإإ ،٬دداارفلأاا دحلأ صصاخلاا حلاصلاا ىلع مماعلاا حلاصلاا میيدقتوو ةماعلاا ة 
امھهنیيب.  	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and asserting the state’s obligation in supporting the latter in case a conflict arises 
between individual and collective interests.  	  
From here, it is important to attempt to identify patterns in constitutional 
jurisprudence, in order to better understand the philosophical drives behind the 
Egyptian judicial system’s decisions in cases related to individual rights, including 
freedom of expression. Before delving into that, however, there needs to be an 
analysis of the wider power dynamic that is conducive to our constitutional logic. The 
next chapter is an application of established theories on power to the Egyptian model 
and is followed by a close breakdown of constitutional jurisprudence that ultimately 
preserves censorship. 	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II. The Institutionalization of Morality: Knowledge and Power	  	  
In Volume One of The History of Sexuality, Foucault explains bio-power as “a power, 
which takes hold of human life.” Throughout this work, Foucault traces the shift from 
sovereign power to disciplinary and bio-power, or a shift from “a right of death to a 
power over life.”82 Sovereign power is the right to take life or let live, or take away 
labor, property or services.83 It is not concerned with regulation or control. Bio-power, 
however, through both discipline84 and regulation, is interested in character, 
conditions, and the overall state of the population. What goes under this understanding 
of power is an interest in education, health, culture and public morality. This is a 
result of the power dynamics that caused the “emergence of the population,” a being 
whose habits of nutrition, health, knowledge and reproduction have to be monitored 
and recorded by the state.85 Foucault does not try to ascribe value to power, but rather 
tries to understand it through what he calls “analytics,” or the breakdown of modes of 
power. To him, disciplinary power, for instance, is not an adversarial relationship, but 
is one where individuals are subjects and power relations are called into being by free 
actions.86 Dany Lacombe critiques the social control thesis and adopts a Foucauldian 
approach to study penal law reform: 	  
“[…] In light of his work on sexuality and governmentality, I examine how Foucault’s 
productive notion of power, already outlined in Discipline and Punish, should not be 
reduced to a claim for the production of social control. It is best understood in terms of 
“a mechanism for life” that includes strategies for both self-development that both 
constrain- through objectifying techniques- and enable, through subjectifying 
techniques- agency. […] In fact, Foucault gradually understood the constitution of the 
modern subject not in terms of strategies of domination, but rather, in terms of 
“governmentality” to maximize life. This conception of power and the subject 
facilitates an understanding of law reform that does not reduce to it a structure that 
simply reproduces the dominant social order.”87	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 DIANNA TAYLOR, MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS 41 (Acumen 2010) (2010). 
83 Id. 
84 Discipline is at times used as a distinct mode of power and at others used by Foucault within the 
understanding of bio-power.  
85 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY- VOL. 1: AN INTRODUCTION 25 (Vintage Books 
1990) (1978). 
86 Roger Deacon, Strategies of Governance Michel Foucault on Power, 92 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 113, 113-148 (1998).	  
87 Dany Lacombe, Reforming Foucault: A Critique of the Social Control Thesis,  
47 THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 334, 332-352 (1996). 
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The interest the Egyptian state takes in its modern subjects, and the 
mechanisms by which it practices censorship and regulates morality, is not channeled 
through an adversarial relationship. The model described above applies to the bond 
between state institutions regulating morality and its subjects — it is not a conscious 
strategy of domination, but an interest in the maximization of these lives, that 
permeates and reflects through the subjects themselves. There is a consensus over the 
ideal, the moral and what the state demands of the different representatives of 
morality, which includes art. The ideas of what art is, what is required of it and what 
purpose it is intended to serve, is not only promoted by the state, but also by its 
subjects, who are in conformity, cooperation and agreement with its institutions. 
Through the establishment of bodies such as the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs, the Vice Police, and Al-Azhar, there is a general institutionalization 
and policing of morality. As shown through the courts’ jurisprudence, this conception 
of the good and the moral is promoted and preserved at every chance and regulated by 
the state on an institutional level. 	  
The process Foucault describes of sex exploding into discourse during the 18th 
and 19th centuries is somewhat similar to the treatment of art as being representative 
of morality and sexuality, or a medium of expression for their components, within the 
Egyptian state. Foucault describes the process as “the multiplication of discourses 
concerning sex in a field of exercise of power itself: an institutional incitement to 
speak about it and to do more and more; a determination on the parts of the agencies 
of power to hear it spoken about, to cause it to speak through explicit articulation and 
endlessly accumulated detail.”88 The channels for this explicit articulation, however, 
were limited to a form that, although endless, were nonetheless specific in their type. 	  
He explains the moving away from the Middle Ages’ organization around the 
theme of the flesh, and the practice of penance as a discourse, to the more recent 
centuries where “an explosion of distinct discursivities took form in demography, 
biology, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, ethics, pedagogy, and political criticism.89 
There is a dispersion of the centers from which these discourses arise, and it is not a 
vertical but rather a horizontal extension where the forms of these discourses 
diversified, meaning that “rather than a massive censorship, beginning with the verbal 
properties imposed by the Age of Reason, what was involved was a regulated and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 FOUCAULT, supra note 86, at 18. 
89 Id. at 33. 
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polymorphous incitement to discourse.”90 With all their diversity, these discourses, 
however, still stick to a specific form, the form of being useful, by virtue of being a 
discourse that exists for the purposes of transcription, theorization and regulation. Sex 
is confined to its reproductive value and pleasure exists within the conjugal context, 
which had been established as the norm and the only arena where sex can be left alone 
as it settles into its normalcy. As much as sex was heavily present through these 
endless discourses, it was silent anywhere else — a silence of certain forms that could 
be considered ‘crude’ or ‘coarse’ that was necessary for discourses to function around 
a cluster of power relations.91	  
The rigid process of institutionalization of morality has led to a similar route 
with art as a representative of morality. Akin to sex in Foucault’s model, which is 
regulated through useful discourses, art is allowed limited paths and manifestations 
that are confined to the moral values demanded of it. Just like debauchers, libertines, 
homosexuals and hermaphrodites were rejected as irregular sexualities and could not 
stand on their own outside the channels of useful discourse and objectification, art is 
under the same pressure to be valuable, morally appropriate and limited to the 
confines of useful and meaningful practice. Otherwise, it cannot exist and cannot be 
termed as art. 	  
 From this point comes an assumption that Egyptian society, including its own 
artists, is infatuated with: the concept of “useful” art. A fundamental underlying basis 
for the notion of censorship, this means that if a work cannot be argued to be socially 
valuable, carrying a moral or cautionary message, then censorship is justifiable. 
Conceptual transformations that occur within the art scene can induce change in the 
laws, and the state can, in some cases, be compelled to respond to them. In his piece, 
“The Influence of the Art for Art's Sake Movement upon English Law, 1780–1959,” 
In an interesting piece tracing the relationship between law and art, Dawn Watkins 
gives an analysis of how the law reacts to the evolutionary separation of art from 
conventional morality, hence changing its own standards to judge the artistic.92 
Watkins sees the connection between public morality and art, and, thus observes the 
law’s reaction to changing morality and art as they in turn change one another. His 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Id. at 34. 
91 Id. at 30.	  
92  Dawn Watkins, The Influence of the Art for Art's Sake Movement upon English Law, 1780–1959, 
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY 233, (2007). 
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article deals with the law as it eventually becomes separate from the artistic, a 
disengaged judge that is forced to deal with that subject matter and can only offer 
insight through a framework of legal theory specifically about and for law. In this 
case, the progression of art’s ideas about itself leads to change in the channels through 
which the state can interfere with it. Artists no longer accept the moral judgment 
placed on their works and subsequently remove it as a defining factor, hence obliging 
the state to change its own perception of what is art and how to judge it. 	  
About his infamous classic Lolita, Vladimir Nabokov makes this statement: “I 
am neither a reader nor a writer of didactic fiction, […] Lolita has no moral in tow. 
For me a work of fiction exists only insofar as it affords me what I shall bluntly call 
aesthetic bliss, that is a sense of being somehow, somewhere, connected with other 
states of being where art (curiosity, tenderness, kindness, ecstasy) is the norm.”93  
While only a minority holds this definition, it is apparently not the norm even within 
the artistic community in Egypt, which is shown throughout earlier sections and will 
be discussed in more detail shortly. There is no agreement on separating art from 
morality, which would be the first step toward the breakdown of censorship. 	  
The interest the state takes in art is not one of banishment or rejection, and it is 
not from an antagonistic position, but rather a stance of support, acceptance and an 
active effort to watch it grow and develop as part of this strategy of governmentality 
and maximization of life. It falls, however, within this conception of the good the state 
has so solidly reiterated over the years, and which it has decided draws the boundaries 
of how art can be useful and an indispensable tool for the betterment of its subjects 
and the society. The moment art deviates from the required moral — not artistic — 
parameters, it is subject to the scrutiny, uproar and analysis of society, just as Foucault 
describes how “inconsequential bucolic pleasures, could become, from a certain time, 
the object not only of a collective intolerance but of a judicial action, a medical 
intervention, a careful clinical examination, an entire theoretical elaboration.”94	  
 In the next chapter, I attempt to analyze the logic of the SCC and how the idea 
of useful art and the state’s pronounced conception of the good permeate through our 
constitutional jurisprudence to maintain state censorship as a general concept. 	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94 FOUCAULT, supra note 86, at 31. 
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III. Egyptian Constitutionalism and Public Policy	  
The idea promoted by the state, and throughout the constitution, of a shared standard 
of morality, tradition and common values resonates with John Rawls’ idea of public 
reason.95 Rawls puts a lot of faith in what he calls the “moral duty of civility,” which 
requires equal citizens to explain and justify their political choices to each other with 
“fair-mindedness,” in light of agreed upon general and fundamental political values. 
There is the assumption that everyone will be in agreement on the content of public 
reason (on which citizens will base their justifications). Those general principles are 
already established in Rawls’ theory and the problem lies solely in trying to be 
compatible with them. 	  
By the same logic, Rawls states that matters of constitutional essentials, as 
well as basic structure of governmental and public policies have to be justified to all 
citizens based only on widely accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found 
in common sense. The Egyptian constitution and state seems to be making the same 
problematic assumption that Rawls is making in thinking there could exist what he 
terms public reason. And the more the state believes in the existence of this notion, the 
more it strives to force it into manifestation.  	  
Regardless of the extensive critique Rawls receives for the infeasibility of this 
mechanism of equal intellectual effort from all citizens to invent, not an aggregate, but 
customized system of belief that appeals to all, the main factor in his theory is the 
actual input of “citizens.” The Egyptian state, on the other hand, has already assumed 
what that system is and is continuously working against any change to it. It has a 
placed a standard of “public policy” as, Maurits Berger puts it, against which all rights 
are to be weighed. In his article, “Secularizing Interreligious Law in Egypt”, Berger 
gives us a presentation of how personal status law was divided between family courts, 
which each applied one of the nine family laws dictated by the Muslim, Christian and 
Jewish communities that lived in Egypt under the Ottoman regime and up until the 
1952 revolution. Every individual was subject to his/her own religious laws and 
enjoyed religious autonomy in matters of personal status. This changed with the 	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reforms of 1955, when family courts were abolished and non-Muslim laws could only 
be applied in matters of marriage and divorce, and only in compliance with the 
barometer of “public policy.”  That barometer of public policy was decided to be 
relevant Islamic principles. The unification of courts under a single, national court 
was said to serve “the purpose of national unity by subjecting all Egyptians, regardless 
of their religion, to a single judiciary that was both Egyptian and secular.”96	  
This notion of equal citizenship, ironically, achieved the very opposite of 
equality. The state intended to unify citizens as equal subjects of the law, except the 
law is, by nature, discriminatory and explicitly favors the religion of one over the 
other, by making the law synonymous with that religion. Equal citizens are brought 
before courts that apply on them laws dictated by a religion they do not adhere to. 
Furthermore, the courts actually set that religion as the (public policy) standard when 
applying those different factions’ own religious laws. The problem here lies in the 
choice the state made to select a certain ideal to favor, or, in other words, adopt a 
conception of the good to endorse. The state, in this case, claims equal citizenship for 
all of its subjects, calls its personal status law pluralistic and alleges to be respectful of 
other ideals; however, this all comes to nothing when said ideals conflict with the 
state’s own conception of the good. 	  
This same notion can be seen throughout the jurisprudence of the SCC and its 
analysis of where other constitutional provisions stand vis-à-vis article 2 (in which the 
standard of public policy is exemplified). Religious culture is probably the main 
outcome determinant of Egyptian constitutional jurisprudence in many fields. There 
seems to be an implicit use of the constitution to further the ultimate goal for the rule 
of law of Islamic Shari’a. The placement of the principles of Islamic Shari’a as the 
main source of legislation by article 2 of the Egyptian constitution has resulted in a 
unique form of constitutionalism that is quite different from constitutionalism rooted 
in a culture of liberal democracy, for instance. In the textual structure of the 
constitution, articles protecting individual rights are not placed with lower priority 
than article 2, but the jurisprudence of the court proves article 2 to have a hierarchical 
relationship with other articles in the constitution, as exemplified by the case of Darb 
Al-Hawa and that will be shown through SCC decisions shortly. Alongside article 2, 
the Egyptian Supreme Court deemed the standard of public policy to which all 	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legislation or judicial review would be held equivalent to Islamic Shari’a, as it makes 
up the fiber of shared ideals and values in Egyptian society, such as the articles cited 
in the previously discussed case. 	  
When comparing the jurisprudence of the Egyptian court to that of a liberal 
democracy, the focus of the reasoning is remarkably different. In Roe v. Wade97, the 
American Supreme Constitutional Court was to decide on whether those statutes 
criminalizing abortions violated any constitutional rights of the woman getting the 
abortion. What is of interest here is the process by which the court decides if a 
constitutional right had been lawfully violated. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court 
follows the doctrine that requires the state to have a compelling state interest to violate 
fundamental rights of citizens, and that the means by which the interest is achieved 
has to be the least restrictive on the citizen. In this case, the compelling state interest 
was the preservation of the right to life (or the potentiality of life, as the court puts it) 
against the right to privacy of the woman. The process of limiting a constitutional 
right in a culture of liberal democracy, hence, is individualistic, attempting to balance 
one individual right against the other. 	  
The rationale differs when it comes to the Egyptian SCC. The SCC decided on 
the question of Baha’is in 1975, when Baha’i individuals challenged the 
constitutionality of Decree 263, as part of their appeal when convicted of illegal 
activities based on said decree. The court adopted quite an interesting approach to 
interpreting religious freedom and equality in the Egyptian constitution. It gave itself 
complete discretion in deciding what the text should mean, and managed to attribute 
connotations to it that go far beyond the capacity of the script itself. It concedes that 
freedom of belief and practice are both granted in the 1971 constitution, but swiftly 
limits the freedom of practice to the contours of “public order,” based not on the text 
of the 1971 constitution, but on texts of previous constitutions that explicitly mention 
public order as a limitation on the freedom to practice religion.98 The court states that, 
even though the limitation of public order is overlooked by this current constitution, 
this does not mean that the concept has fallen apart or that omitting it from the text 
was, in any way, intentional. The court hence deems Baha’is undeserving of that right 
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based on their disruption of public order (which the court decided to be Islamic 
Shari’a). 	  
The SCC placed their violation of what it deemed as public policy as a 
legitimate excuse for a limit on the Baha’is religious freedom and their right to 
freedom of expression, both protected rights under the 1971 constitution. In this case, 
we see the jurisprudence of the Egyptian courts to be remarkably different from that 
of the US Constitutional Court. While the latter attempts to balance different rights 
against each other, the Egyptian Court is not seriously concerned with those rights as 
much as it is concerned with whether it can afford to grant those rights in light of what 
it deems to be public policy. Citizens are explicitly deemed unequal before the law, 
because public policy prefers one group to the other. Freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion are violable rights, not because they violate the rights of other 
individuals or groups, but because they violate public policy. Public policy, in this 
context, is what the majority believe to be the tenets of their society, as opposed to 
minorities, such as Baha’is. Hence, from this case, the court cannot be seen to adhere 
to the concept of constitutionalism as it is intended to function in a liberal democracy, 
namely to limit the power of the majority.	  
The Egyptian constitution and the SCC jurisprudence then will remain home to 
the most fundamental conflict: the tension between article 2 and the provisions 
obliging the state to protect the shared values of the Egyptian family, as public policy 
and the liberal individual rights afforded by the constitution. We can see this tension 
between a cultural aspect and individual rights in the jurisprudence of other 
Constitutional Courts; however, they are resolved differently. In the example of the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, the question of whether the display of the 
Christian symbol of a crucifix inside state-owned classrooms violated some students’ 
rights to freedom of religion was decided on in 1995.99 In this case, there was tension 
between the cultural association with Christianity and its symbols and the individual 
rights of students to freedom of religion. These tensions were not inherent in the 
constitution, but they are tensions within the political culture surrounding the FCC and 
the German Basic Law. 	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The way the state resolved this tension was by claiming neutrality, by 
consciously choosing not to move this tension from the realm of societal conflicts to 
that of the constitutional. In the case of Egypt, the complete opposite took place. As 
unresolvable as these tensions between article 2 and other rights, the SCC decided, 
through its insertion of the concept of public policy and by virtue of its legislative 
power, to place article 2 and Islamic Shari’a as the ultimate test to what rights will or 
will not be protected. The Egyptian state, officially endorsing Islamic principles as the 
primary source of legislation, does not think it needs to act as an intermediary, as one 
party to the conflict is inherently superior to the other. Whenever there is tension 
between liberal individual rights and article 2, or the principles of Islamic Shari’a, the 
latter will win. 	  
The institution of censorship will remain intact so long as the state has already 
assumed the obligation to defend and preserve what it sees as the public reason. 
Freedom of expression will remain one of the compromised rights if the question ever 
arises within the courts. The flipside is also just as significant to explain the complex 
narrative surrounding censorship in Egypt. It is important to trace and describe the 
intricate relationship between artists, intellectuals and state censorship, which will be 
discussed in the upcoming section.	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IV. Subject-making: Artists and Intellectuals	  
 
With this dynamic in mind, the focus now shifts to the “subjects” of this power 
dynamic and their relationship to the state’s institutions of morality. As mentioned 
before, there seems to be a Rawlsian consensus over the moral parameters of Egyptian 
society, as iterated by its constitutions and preserved by its courts and institutions. 
This power relationship, one that is not necessarily of dominance, can be seen as it 
echoes from both the public and artists/filmmakers/intellectuals. There are challenges 
to the system, but within specific structures as agreed upon collectively by a society. 	  
There seems to be an implicit liaison between the state and the intellectuals, 
where they do not necessarily stand at opposite ends from one another but engage in a 
complex and organic dynamic where artists are sometimes one with the state. In the 
case of Al-Mozniboun, the committee created by the Minister of Culture to review the 
film and suggest edits to be made before permitting the film to screen once again was 
comprised of different intellectual figures, including director Ahmed Kamel Morsi 
and figures hailing from the fields of sociology, law and publishing. The most 
noteworthy name, however, is renowned writer Yusuf Idris, whose short stories, plays 
and novels are pillars of realism in Egyptian literature that go over themes of 
corruption, perversions and frustrated sexualities.100 The content of his works is often 
sexually charged and is a raw depiction of the emotions, realities and disturbances that 
fall under the themes he tries to portray. The fact that he would be included in a 
committee to review and censor a film, especially one based on a novel by prominent 
writer Naguib Mahfouz, is worth highlighting. It is, firstly, a step by the state to claim 
its cooperation with and closeness to the intellectuals and patrons of the arts. I cannot 
ascribe personal affiliations or factors that might have led the famous author to 
participate in the committee reviewing Al-Mozniboun, but can only attribute a belief in 
the system of censorship on, at least, a conceptual level to have agreed to become one 
with the apparatus. One would argue that artists can get involved with the institutions 
of censorship to instigate change from within; however, there are no notes of the 
meetings of said committee to give us an idea of what that particular member agreed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 ALI, supra note 12, at 321. 
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or objected to in relation to the suggested edits. However, as previously demonstrated, 
the edits were fairly invasive and trespassed all creative and expressive rights afforded 
to the filmmakers. This participation indicates an acceptance of the notion of 
censorship at the very least. The same argument applies to the appointment of figures 
such as Ali Abou Shady, which indicates progressiveness on the state’s side, and the 
outcome of the type of films that are allowed to the market changes with every head 
that leads the Central Administration for Censorship. Nonetheless, the involvement of 
artists and intellectuals with the Board, in a way where they end up being the 
decision-makers on what is to be censored, allows one to infer the acceptance of the 
concept of censorship by at least a considerable portion of them, even if their 
perceptions vary from one type of content to the other. 	  
Ali Abou Shady, in an interview from 2009, states that even though he, as a 
writer, does not think there should be any limits to freedom of creativity, he cannot be 
in denial about the reality he lives in, as censorship is essential to execute the law that 
places restrictions over speech and art. Shady claims that only when real democracy 
manifests in Egypt can state censorship be demolished, and only then will there be a 
form of societal censorship to regulate artistic material.101 Shady still maintains the 
idea that there is need for censorship; however, in his opinion, its source should be 
society, rather than the state. 	  
This rationale is continuous from the 1970s onwards. In the previously 
mentioned example of obtaining the permit for the screening of Darb Al-Hawa and 
Khamsa Bab (Five Doors), another film whose permit was also revoked on 24th of 
August, 1983, the reaction to the ministry’s decision was quite demonstrative of the 
dynamic I describe. The two films seemed to have spurred collective outrage and 
prompted major support for the ministry’s decision to remove the two films off the 
market. The two films generally discussed some political themes, but contained 
relatively heavy sexual insinuations, drug-related content and depicted the physical 
and societal atmospheres surrounding prostitution. Many perceived the films, 
including a number of critics and filmmakers, as frivolous and meager attempts at 
making art. The sentiments toward the films were ones of rejection and a fear of the 
mildest implication that these two films would be attributed to the Egyptian film 
industry, as they were to be considered acts of defamation to the entire profession. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Alaa’ Al-Sawi, Ali Abo Shady Ra’is Al- Riqaba ‘Ala Al-Mosanafat Al-Faneya (2 February 2009), 
available at http://www.masress.com/misrelgdida/225.  
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One article written by director Medhat Al-Seba’y starts with thanking then-Minister 
Abdel Hamid Radwan for his strong stance against “the wave of trashy films that has 
recently gone viral and damaged Egyptians’ reputation inside and outside of Egypt,” 
urging him to review the permits given to other films of a similar sort that depict “the 
lives of prostitutes, pimps and homosexuals.”102	  	  
Another article, written by film critic Ires Nazmy, also praises the minister’s decision 
and claims that this is what the ministry should be doing to protect the film industry 
from such shameful works:103	  
Like everyone else, I felt relief with the minister’s decision to ban these two films that 
I consider the greatest offense to Egyptian cinema, its critics, audience and history. 
The minister’s brave decision protects us from the sorts of those films.	  	  
These strong opinions coming from the heart of the film community indicates 
widespread support for the general role of the Board, and even a demand for a 
stronger presence. 	  
In an interview with Atef Soleiman, the film critic and journalist reiterates the 
need for censorship and the natural role of the state as a moral agent, stating that 
“censorship exists in other countries and the formalization of the process in Egypt 
started in synchronization with countries like Russia with the evolution of theatre. All 
states feel the need to protect public morals, and I believe that freedom of expression 
and specifically art, should be respected as long as it does not harm others.”104 
Soleiman believes that art cannot exist without state censorship, and rhetorically asks 
if freedom means showing a nude man on screen. When asked how an artist is 
expected to depict sexual content that is indispensible to the artwork, Soleiman claims 
that there are ways to work around it and suggested euphemism and allusions.	  
 Another opinion to note is prominent actor Ezzat El-Alayly’s, who sees the 
necessity for state censorship as justified by the high level of illiteracy and the very 
poor educational standard in Egypt. He believes the state has a role to protect and to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 SABAH AL-KHEIR, October 1, 1983. Arabic original:  ننااوضرر دیيمحلاادبع ةفاقثلاا ریيززوو ركشن ننأأ عبطلاب انبجااوو نم
 ججرراخلااوو لخاادلاا يف نیيیيرصملااوو رصم ةعمس ًااریيثك تتءاسااوو ةةرتفلاا ههذھھھه يف تترشتساا يتلاا ةلذتبملاا مملافلأاا ةجوم ههاجت مساحلاا فقوم ىلع
اا ةیيباقرلاا صیيخاارتلاا ةعجاارم كلذكوو نیيملیيفلاا ضضرع فقوب ههرمأأ رردصأف يتلااوو ةیيعونلاا ههذھھھه تحت ججرردنت يتلاا مملافلأاا نم ریيثكل تحنم يتل
ایيسنج ذذووذشلااوو نیيددااوقلااوو تتاارھھھهاعلاا ةةایيح للووانتت ً◌.	  
103  AKHER SA’A, September 31, 1983. Arabic original:  ریيززوو رراارقل لماكلاا دیيدشلاا ححایيتررلإاب عیيمجلاا لثم تترعش دقل
 امھھھهربتعاا نیيذلاا نیيملیيفلاا نیيذھھھه فقوب ةفاقثلاا ةفاقثلاا ریيززوو رراارق ننإإ .ھهلك اھهخیيرراتوو اھھھهرروھهمجوو اھھھهدداقنلوو ةیيرصملاا  امنیيسلل ةةءاسإإ ربكأأ
مملافلأاا كلت نم ًاعیيمج انل ةیيامح ععاجشلاا. 
104 Interview with Atef Soleiman, journalist and critic. August 24, 2014. 	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elevate public taste.105 He also agrees with Soleiman on the use of allusions instead of 
an explicit and vivid depiction of morally inappropriate content. He gives the example 
of the film Al-Tawoos (The Peacock, 1982), where the events are set during a wedding 
night, but where the director does not film a sexual act and merely refers to it, and, 
thus, constructively discusses themes related to a societal issue without exposing the 
audience to any content that might shock them. El-Alayly also states that if the 
censoring committee was intelligent enough, it should recognize the social value of 
such a film and not object to this type of storytelling. He does not believe censorship 
should be practiced when it comes to political content, but only content that could be 
deemed morally questionable. 	  
Film critic and writer Ola El-Shaffei offers insight into the context in which 
the majority of artists and intellectuals have come to support censorship to varying 
degrees.106 El-Shaffei herself is not a proponent of censorship. She believes the 
relevant laws currently in place are obsolete and loosely formulated, which leaves art 
unprotected against cultural setbacks and changing ideologies. She explains how a 
major cultural shift took place in the 1970s, with mass migration to the Gulf from 
Egypt and the transference of the Wahabi mindset to the Egyptian society with those 
returning later to it, which brought with it an extremism that had never existed before 
in Egypt. She mentions an incident in a press conference around the film Banat El 
A’mm  (The Cousins, 2012) where director Dawood Abdel Sayid was brought up in 
the discussion. El-Shaffei claims that the three leading actors in the film unanimously 
agreed that his films are to be deemed inappropriate, and that they do not understand 
the necessity behind the sex scene he filmed in his Rasayil El Bahr (Letters from the 
Sea, 2010). She believes that Egyptian society has difficulty in accepting any “other,” 
or those who do not conform to a predetermined ideal. 	  	  
A. The Minority Voices	  	  
It would, nevertheless, be inaccurate to claim that censorship has gone unchallenged 
up until now. There have been voices within artist and intellectual circles  that oppose 
censorship and many of the practices of the Central Administration for Censorship. 
Intellectuals and writers have spoken out against censorship of literature and art on 	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106 Interview with Ola El-Shaffei, journalist and film critic. August 27, 2014.  
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numerous occasions, particularly against censorship that serves political purposes. In 
an interview in 2001 with Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz, the author was asked 
about his opinion on the concept of censoring literary works and whether he supported 
the notion itself. Mahfouz stated that he rejected the notion of censorship entirely and 
that he believed that there has to be complete freedom in art from any external 
censors.107 Many artists shared and still share Mahfouz’s sentiments toward 
censorship. What is remarkable, however, is that Mahfouz himself was a consultant 
for cinema affairs to the Ministry of Culture from 1969 to 1971, and director of the 
Central Administration for Censorship during the late 1960s, where he was quite the 
stringent censor on many works, despite his opinions on censorship.108	  	  
When it comes specifically to film, there were sporadic and scattered 
criticisms of the state’s regulation of film material. In relation to the Darb Al-
Hawa/Khamsa Bab incident, prominent screenwriter and film critic Raouf Tewfik 
objected to the minister’s decision, stating that:	  
The government’s interference to ban a film, regardless of its quality, 
means that the film community is incapable of defending the reputation 
of its craft; it also means that we need the state to think for its citizens 
and guide them towards what is right and protect them from what is 
wrong as if the state’s institution of censorship is the sole executioner for 
this helpless people that is need for someone to cry over its damaged 
reputation. 109 	  	  
Despite similar opinions, there were never any consolidated efforts to call for 
abolishing the institution of censorship, and the notion was only introduced toward the 
later years of Mubarak’s reign, only to manifest after the 25th of January revolution. 	  
A wave of newly introduced and organized social movements commenced 
following the 25th of January revolution in 2011. With this trend comes the first 
organized movement against film censorship in 2012: the Egyptian Creativity Front. 
This was founded by a number of filmmakers and film critics at a moment when a 
window was open for the assertion of freedoms and a fight against the state’s 
overbearing interference in matters related to the arts had hopes to be won, as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Gihan Al- Hosseini, Naguib Mahfouz: U’ayid Wazir Al-Thaqafa fi Mawqefo min Al- Riwayat Al- 
Mamnou’a (18 February 2001), available at: 
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?issueno=8070&article=26716#.U0GRZRlVTbg. 
108 Interview with Tarek Al- Shenawy, Film Critic at Al- Tahrir Newspaper and other Publications. 
April 23, 2014. 	  
109 ALI, supra note 12, at 328. 
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reaction to the intellectual ambitions the Muslim Brotherhood held in terms of 
influencing culture. The Front is outspoken on all matters related to art and has 
initiated strikes and sit-ins in response to state decisions on artistic institutions. The 
most recent of these was a two-week long sit in that took place in April 2013 in front 
of the headquarters of the Ministry of Culture, held after Opera House director and 
flutist Inas Abdel Dayem was dismissed by ousted President Mohamed Morsi’s 
government. The Front is not always, however, in opposition with the Central 
Administration for Censorship, and their position depends on the stances the 
Administration takes under different managements. 	  
In recent months, the Front has been issuing statements supporting the work of 
the Administration in being relatively progressive in terms of the permits they are 
issuing for recent films. As mentioned before, the decisions of the Administration are 
not always consistent, and at times are considered to be more progressive or more 
stringent depending on the leading figure. Since September 2013, the Administration 
has come under the management of director Ahmed Awad, whose decisions have been 
hailed as pro-art and the film community.110 The most recent incident took place after 
the release of the American production Noah, on which Al-Azhar issued a fatwa in 
March 2014 that deemed its screening incompatible with the principles of Islamic 
law.111 The film portrays the story of the prophet Noah, while the personification of 
prophets in artworks has always been an issue for Al-Azhar. The Administration has 
refused the fatwa issued by Al-Azhar, as it considers the film to be up to par with its 
moral and artistic standards and should not be banned from screening. The Front has 
joined the Administration in its opinion and asked Al-Azhar to move past the 
rigidness of the religious rhetoric and to move toward employing reason and 
rationality. A main crux of the Front’s response to the fatwa was asking the question 
of why Al-Azhar would focus on banning such valuable and purposeful films, such as 
Noah, but leaves films with heavy sexual and violent content untouched.112 The 
reference is made, more specifically, to the class of films that the critics’ community 
would attribute no artistic merit to and considers immature works only produced for 
money generating purposes. These are the type of films that have no protector, no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Interview with Mohamed El-Adl, Producer and Founding Member of the Egyptian Creativity Front. 
April 25, 2014.  
111 Al-Azhar Yatlub Man’ ‘Ard Film Yugasid Shakhseyit Al-Nabi Nuh (April 6 2014), available at: 
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savior from the ferocity of the moral argument. They have no redeeming value in the 
eyes of the intellectual community that would warrant a defense of their right to 
express. This is not, however, the opinion of the more prominent figures in the Front, 
who are a minority in terms of their aspirations of reducing the Administration’s role 
to merely categorizing film according to age appropriateness. 	  
Director Ahmed Awad, a member of the Front and the head of the 
Administration from the 25th of September 2013 to the 17th of April 2014, shared with 
me his ideas on the role of the Administration, which he believes should only be 
confined to age rating of films and not to banning. He does not believe artistic 
expression should be confiscated or edited with only one exception, which is 
profanity.113 This is where he draws the line. He also does not believe film should be 
judged by quality, because this could be used as a pretense to justify censorship for 
political reasons, for instance. When asked why he chose to join forces with the Board 
if he is against the very concept of it, Awad claims to have seen it as an opportunity to 
change from within instead of leaving the institution to others that would stifle 
creative freedoms. “I will not ban a film, a song or an idea,” is what Awad told me 
was his response to the Minister of Culture offering him the post of heading the 
Administration. I asked Awad why he thinks artists do not stand against censorship 
and he responded by saying that “some genuinely believe there should be censorship 
and others do it out of hypocrisy to please the state… in light of the recent incidents, I 
no longer think that change is possible from within.”	  
Another prominent figure is critic Tarek El-Shenawy, who also believes that 
regulating artistic material should only pertain to age rating of artworks and films. He 
argues that the focus should be more on the social effects of the film, rather than 
political reasons, since the censor and the state usually interpret the “protection of 
public order” as the protection of the ruling government and its head.114 When asked if 
artists should practice self-censorship, Shenawy states that artists cannot isolate 
themselves from their societies, and that if a film has too much sexual or profane 
content, it will not be well received. He argues that artists who believe that this kind 
of content will increase a work’s popularity are mistaken, and states that this was 
never the case in Egypt. He still maintains, however, that there should not be state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Interview with Ahmed Awad, Director and Former head of the Central Administration for 
Censorship. April 22, 2014.  
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censorship. Shenawy also asserts that the public usually rejects explicit sexual content, 
regardless of the artistic or social value of the film, but the artists and intellectuals 
themselves are the ones who make this distinction between a “socially valuable” film 
and one that isn’t. On how artists join forces with the state on matters related to 
censorship and its institutions, Shenawy claims that artists do not stick to their 
opinions if they feel it might anger the government. However, he also says that 
genuine intentions are not clear, and recounts a story in which he “was once told by 
[director] Saeed Marzouk, who can confirm the incident, that Naguib Mahfouz is the 
one who stood against Al-Khof  (Fear), which was made after the 1967 war, and 
objected to its screening.” He also claims that even though the institutions of 
censorship were always criticized, there were never any movements that called for its 
abolition. 	  
In another interview, producer and founding member of the Front Mohamed El 
Adl gives an account for how the Front started. According to him, the Front, as the 
first organized movement to protect freedom of expression in the creative context, was 
created as a reaction to the Muslim Brotherhood’s growing influence and fear for the 
arts from the rising rightist tendencies. In response to the question of whether the 
Front was created to battle Islamist movements and not necessarily the state’s 
censorship apparatus, El Adl claims that the Front acknowledges the permanence of 
the Administration and does not call for its abolishment, but instead calls for its 
restructuring to a rating system according to age appropriateness. El Adl also traces 
the ideology of the Board to the exported Wahabi influences that entered Egypt in the 
1970s, stating that “the Board has three taboos: sex, religion and politics. And it’s not 
possible to measure art by morality. In what they call the golden age of cinema, we 
used to count how many kisses we would find in an Abdel Halim Hafiz film. Those 
types of films would be taboos nowadays, and that is because of the changes Egypt 
saw in the 1970s that reshaped our ideas about religion and art. It turned us into 
something completely different.” 	  
The only instances, according to El Adl, where the Front would side with the 
Administration is when the Board is defending the freedom of a film that is rejected 
by other institutions such as Al-Azhar. “I sided, however, with the Administration 
when Ahmed Awad wanted to edit a derogatory term out of the film Asrar ’A’elaya 
(Family Secrets, 2014),” El Adl states, referring to the film depicting a story about 
homosexuality in Egypt. “I thought it was more of artistic weakness than necessity, 
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they did not need to use such a term. It is their absolute right, however, to discuss the 
issue of homosexuality, for instance.” 	  
Despite their belief that censorship should not exist to ban or edit, it seems that 
even the minority hold back in terms of absolute freedom of expression. Both Awad 
and El Adl drew the line at profanity, which, in their opinion, would not add any 
artistic value to the work. However, in some cases one would argue that profanity 
could be a realistic part of the depicted story, and is an integral part of telling it. In the 
case of Asrar ’A’elaya, one could argue that the employment of the derogatory term 
used to describe the protagonist is essential in a realistic and raw portrayal of his daily 
encounters, his psyche or his societal struggles.	  
On the participation of artists and intellectuals in the Administration, El Adl 
claims that a director like Ahmed Awad attempted a change from within by trying not 
to be the censor that he was expected to be. However, someone like critic Ali Abou 
Shady was still a censor — no matter how progressive he was, he still fulfilled the 
fundamental role of the censor and genuinely believed in it. El Adl was also asked 
about the majority of artists who seem to defend the role of censorship and the 
Administration, and responded by stating that he believes that the older they are in 
terms of age, the more they believe in the need for society to protect. He gives the 
example of actor Ezzat El-Alayly, who is now against the screening of the film 
Halawit Roh (whose case will be discussed in a later section), even though he starred 
in a film in the late 1960s called Zi’ab La Ta’kol Al-Lahm (Wolves That Do Not Eat 
Meat, 1973) that was full of sexually explicit scenes. According to El Adl, the others 
also genuinely believe in the moral argument of censorship and the need to protect 
against the “negative” influence of films, which eventually affects the power of the 
artists to battle the state and its apparatuses. He believes that the Egyptian society has 
“frozen” the moral ideals that it wants to see and anything that falls outside it is 
deemed as “irregular” or outside the scope of morality.	  
One can conclude from these opinions that there are more substantial efforts 
towards fighting censorship and state interference in artistic expression compared to 
the previous decades. However, the majority of opinions still seem to agree with the 
role of the Administration in terms of editing and censorship. Moreover, even those 
who believe the Board should be restructured often seem to draw arbitrary moral 
lines, such as agreeing with censoring profanity by arguing that it would not add to the 
artwork as a whole and can be dispensed with. The Rawlsian moral fabric, thus, still 
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persists, even underneath relatively progressive and commendable efforts, which 
leaves me questioning how far these movements will actually go in terms of securing 
absolute freedom of the artistic process. A more recent case that can attest to the 
existence of this dynamic is the case of Halawit Roh (The Beauty of Roh, 2014), 
which shows the continuity of sentiments projected in the 1970s and 80s toward films 
that are considered harmful to society.	  	  
B. The Case of Halawit Roh: The Full Dynamic 
 
The ongoing controversy created by the film Halawit Roh has come to be the most 
demonstrative example of the Egyptian society’s ideas about obscenity and the 
purpose of art. The film is loosely based on the Italian award-winning film Malèna, 
where a beautiful widow “provokes sensual awakenings in a group of adolescent 
boys” in 1940s Italy. In the Egyptian version, the film depicts the story of a woman 
who becomes the object of sexual fantasy of all the men in her neighborhood, 
including a group of young adolescents, and, in particular, a 13-year-old boy who 
fantasizes about Roh, the main character, throughout the film. 	  
The Board initially issued an extensive report, which Ahmed Awad rejected, 
releasing a permit for the film to be screened. The report of the review Board 
contained comprehensive remarks that touched upon not only visual elements, but 
also the holistic message that is allegedly implied by the film. For instance, the report 
includes comments about what the negative role models depicted in the film could 
imply:115	  
1. A wife whose husband travels, but wears revealing clothes through 
which one can see her chest throughout the whole film and still 
maintains that she is virtuous and honorable. It is a negative image 
of the Egyptian woman who undresses once her husband is away.  
2. All the men in the neighborhood care for nothing but how to acquire 
the body of Roh, and live a lifestyle full of alcohol, prostitutes and 
sex-enhancing drugs.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Mohamed Abdel Kareem, Bayan Al- Riqaba ‘an “Halawit Roh”, AL TAHRIR NEWSPAPER, April 21 
2014 at 16. 
	  	   46	  
3. All the women of in the neighborhood are promiscuous… The only 
virtuous woman is Roh, who only seduces the characters and 
eventually rejects them.  
4. All the children in the film are criminals and little pimps…. their 
leader snoops around Roh to peek at her body, and the rest are either 
watching pornography on their mobile phones or discussing their 
friend having sex with Roh.  
These are the type of comments the Committee gave as reasons to reject the film, 
arguing against its obscene content and representations, along with other numerous 
comments on language and physical indications of obscenity. 	  
The film was released in theatres in the beginning of April 2014, and after a 
mere two weeks of its screening, it stirred enough controversy that a decision was 
made by Prime Minister Ibrahim Mehleb to revoke its permit and remove it from 
theaters. This decision in and of itself created an outrage in the film community, as it 
was perceived by the Administration and its former head Ahmed Awad, as a form of 
overstepping the role of the censor, deeming the entire institution void. This led to 
Awad announcing his resignation from his position in objection to Mehleb’s decision. 	  
 The Prime Minister held a meeting on the 19th of April, 2014, with an 
assembly of intellectuals, producers, directors and critics to discuss the film’s situation 
and the future of the filmmaking industry in light of this incident and what it 
represents. Mehleb also claimed that he did not ban the film outright, but only 
temporarily revoked its license so the Committee could review it. He alleged that this 
decision was taken due to the negative feedback the film received, as well as the 
public outcry against the immoralities depicted in the film, which, according to him, 
misrepresents the Egyptian people and is harmful to their reputation. Opinions were 
markedly divided between supporters of and critics of Mehleb’s decision. Some 
thought it was a necessary decision against obscenity, while others saw it as an 
indication of a grim future, where creativity is vulnerable to arbitrary executive 
decisions that do not pass through the accepted routes of regulation. Mehleb was 
supported by director Ahmed Atef, who claims that the film is a form of prostitution, 
and director Mohamed Fadel, who defended the decision by likening it to the state 
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interfering to confiscate rotten foods being sold to the public.116 Actor Mohamed 
Sobhy claimed to have cried tears of joy, stating that Mehleb’s decision protects his 
grandson, whom he found looking for a bootlegged version of the film on the 
Internet.117	  
 Opponents of the decision, however, are numerous. Critics such as Samir Farid 
and Tarek El-Shenawy, The Egyptian Creativity Front, the head of the Union for 
Cinematics and many other prominent figures and institutions within the film industry 
have attacked the decision to ban the film, arguing that it is a violation of their rights 
as artists. They make it clear that this is not a defense of the film itself, but rather a 
defense of the rule of law as the film was already approved by the Administration. 
They believe that only the Administration and its manager, Ahmed Awad, should have 
the authority to withdraw its screening permit. The reasoning here is quite interesting, 
since it is not an objection to the confiscation of the film based on its content, but an 
objection to the state’s interference in regulating artistic content outside of the 
accepted channels which, in this case, is the censor, and also a state institution. 
Director Dawood Abdel Sayid describes the decision as an outrageous intrusion on the 
role of the censor and indicative of the dreadful phase the arts are going through, 
seeing Ahmed Awad’s resignation as a rightful response to Mehleb’s imposition.118	  
 In this case, the dynamic clearly manifests in different and even contradictory 
positions. On the one hand, the Administration, from the very beginning, rejected the 
film as an indecent misrepresentation of Egyptian society. The public reacted 
negatively to the film and its relatively explicit content, the state interfered to preserve 
the prescribed moral fabric, some artists and factions of the public supported the 
decision, claiming they cared for the protection of public morality, while others 
objected to the decision, largely because of the channel it went through and partly 
because they are against the arbitrary confiscation artistic material. Through this case, 
all sides can be seen: the majority, the state, the opposing artists that still maintain 
belief in the role of the censor and the unrepresentative minority that opposes the 
concept of censorship.  	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April 21 2014 at 16.	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It would be valid to ask the question of how the Egyptian model differs from 
any other. The evolution of the laws and the different power relation that the state has 
with its citizens makes for a different case than the relatively progressive American 
model, or the purely dominant power relation of the Iranian Islamic state. The 
American model will be looked at in the next section to trace, generally, how the US 
reached a state where censorship is no longer viewed as a necessary function of the 
state. A brief snippet of the Iranian dynamic will be discussed right after to give an 
idea of a different power structure where the bio-power model cannot be applied. 	  	  
C. The American Model	  
 
There was, “a nationwide scheme to enact film censorship” in the early 20th century 
in the US.119 Butters asserts that “almost from the inception of film, the issue of 
control over the exhibition and content of this new entertainment medium became 
important politically and socially. As an increasingly large number of Americans 
flocked to see these new ‘photoplays,’ a powerful and forceful contingent of 
Americans attempted to control what the public saw.”120 	  
The Hays Code in the US regulated film industry from 1930 until 1968, and 
banned violent, profane and sexual content, as well interracial or same-sex 
relationships, or any content it deemed anti-Christian.121 The Code was not enforced 
by the government, but was made necessary by the threat of government censorship. 
The First Amendment did not protect film material122 and the film industry adopted 
the Code as a means of avoiding outright federal censorship. Censorship of film was 
also strongly prevalent on the state level; The Kansas State Board of Review of 
Motion Pictures, for instance, managed to function from 1915 until 1966.123 The US 
Supreme Court, however, started differentiating between artistic works to be protected 
by the First Amendment and obscene works, when it lifted the ban on James Joyce’s 
Ulysses in 1933,124 before finally iterating the constitutional definition of obscenity in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 GERALD R. BUTTERS, BANNED IN KANSAS: MOTION PICTURE CENSORSHIP, 1915-1966 (University of 
Missouri Press 2007) (2007). 
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121 NORA GILBERT, BETTER LEFT UNSAID: VICTORIAN NOVELS, HAYS CODE FILMS, AND THE BENEFITS 
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Miller v. California and later in Roth v. United States.125 Similarly, the UK enacted the 
Obscene Publications Act (OPA) in 1959,126 after a series of cases starting with R v. 
Hicklin127 (from which the US borrowed its first test and standard for “obscenity”). In 
Roth v United States, the Supreme Constitutional Court defined a work as obscene if 
it was “utterly without social importance,” and if “to the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a 
whole appeal[s] to prurient interest.”128 The court could not completely abandon the 
state’s responsibility over artistic material, but still felt the need to create a specific 
standard that should leave all else that falls outside of it constitutionally protected. 	  
This evolution of film censorship in the US can be attributed to a specific 
dynamic and a progression of societal ideas that led to change in the values that 
censorship naturally exists to preserve. The idea of traditional family values and the 
state’s role in protecting them has slowly and gradually disintegrated with the civil 
rights movement, the gradual integration of LGBT rights into legislation and the 
notion of a liberal society that focuses on individual/minority rights, rather than one 
that favors a collective approach to rights. This societal change resulted in a different 
understanding of the role of the state as a moral agent and, even though the state still 
maintains a responsibility over morals and the public good, it fulfills it with the utmost 
care so as not to override individual rights, unless that violation is completely 
defensible and justified.  The state no longer has a say in judging what is artistic and 
what is not, and has limited its test of obscenity (through the jurisprudence of its 
Supreme Constitutional Court) to very specific standards that can only apply to a 
narrow range of productions, that is generally limited to pornography. 	  	  
D. The Iranian Model	  
 
The scope of this paper does not allow for a fair or in-depth analysis of the complex 
and multilayered Iranian cinema experience. However, some areas of comparison can 
be drawn between the Egyptian model and the Iranian one. In both models, there is 
heavy involvement on the part of the state in matters related to creativity, and 
specifically film, as both societies are profoundly culturally dependent on the art form 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 MILLER V. CALIFORNIA, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419. 
126 WATKINS, supra note 93.  
127 R v Hicklin (1868) LR 3 QB 360.  
128 Roth v United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304 (1957).	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that became intertwined with both social fabrics along the years of its long history in 
both countries. The dynamic between the state and the artist, however, varies in both 
models and yields different outcomes in terms of societal change and the evolution of 
art. 	  
The history of cinema in Iran dates back to 1900, when the first documentary 
was produced.129 The first Iranian feature film was produced in 1930, and the industry 
flourished in the 1960s and 1970s under the rule of Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, 
where numerous Iranian films won awards and recognition in international film 
festivals. The Iranian revolution of 1979 brought the governance of Islamist Ulama 
and signaled a change to the entire art culture of Iran. In his first speech after returning 
to Iran from exile, Ayatollah Khomeini showed his support for cinema as a new 
medium that could be utilized to the advantage of the Muslim state: 	  
“We are not opposed to cinema, to radio, or to television… The cinema is a modern 
invention that ought to be used for the sake of educating the people, but as you know, 
it was used instead to corrupt our youth. It is the misuse of cinema that we are 
opposed to, a misuse caused by the treacherous policies of our rulers.”130	  	  
From the very beginning, Khomeini places the usefulness of cinema as a 
condition for its existence in the new Iran. This condition marks the fundamental 
structure for censorship, which took an extreme form in the example of Iran.  	  
As exiled artist Mohamed Karimi Hakak describes it, “artistic censorship in 
Iran usually involves intervention at any one or all of three stages: the artist’s 
intention to create, the artist’s engagement in the creative process and the artist’s 
presentation of he/she created.”131 Hakak is a director whose recreation of 
Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night Dream was stopped on its fourth night in public 
theaters, and who was prosecuted and sent to exile because of the production.132 He 
breaks down the process and the invasiveness of the censorship institution in Iran in 
this excerpt: 	  
At the first stage, the script must be approved. The principal artists — director and/or 
playwright — must be approved. The actors, designers, production staff, and even the 
gofers must be approved. The physical spaces, both for rehearsals and for the 
performance, must be approved. The rehearsal and performance schedule must be 
approved, and so on. Maddeningly, each approval is issued by a different office. As 	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you can imagine it takes months, or even years, before a production secures all the 
necessary approvals. It took me over five years before I was allowed to begin work on 
A Midsummer Night's Dream. The production was closed down on its fourth public 
performance. Only after all these approvals are secured, can the group meet for the 
first time.133	  	  
The author then moves on to describe the next phase, which deals with the 
minutest details in terms of conduct and behavior during the making of the artwork. 
Not only is the content of the product being regulated, but also the “morals” that go 
into the process of bringing it to completion are as well. The author explains how: 	  	  
In this phase, to make sure that nothing against the unspoken, unwritten, unspecified 
laws of moral conduct happens during rehearsals, the male and the female group 
members are not to address each other in any manner that might suggest personal or 
unprofessional communication; they are not to call each other by their first names; 
they are not to use the informal second person pronoun when addressing each other; 
they are not to make repeated eye contact; they are not to wear tight-fitting clothes; 
they are not to sit comfortably next to one another; they are not to smile too much or 
laugh. Touching, even a simple handshake, is unimaginable, and may result in 
blacklisting the person or persons involved, closing down the show, a public 
whipping of up to 80 lashes, and/or imprisonment. Therefore, there are no 
improvisations during rehearsals because that may lead to a line or an action in 
violation of these laws. 	  	  	  
The third phase still lies ahead, that of presentation, the censors attempt to read into 
the work meanings that could possibly amount to negative political, religious or moral 
connotations and the consequences would lead to prosecution: 	  	  
If the group survives the first two stages, there remains the third stage of censorship: 
the scrutiny of the presentation by the authorities. A group of observers are sent to see 
the play prior to its public performance. After they watch the play, the director must 
respond to their criticisms, which can range from choice of costumes to a possible 
hidden meaning of an image or a spoken phrase, from a movement to a specific color 
used in the painting of the sets, from the overall meaning of the production to the 
director's concept and artistic vision, the style of the play, its language, and of course 
the plot. If a production survives the stages of censorship up to this point, and if it is 
eventually issued a Performance Permission, that still does not guarantee that the 
production will run its course. Such was the case with our A Midsummer Night's 
Dream. A few good citizens, or even one individual, ignited by zeal or assigned by 
invisible forces, might decide that your play is indeed detrimental to the public 
interest. The remaining performances of your show can then be canceled. 
Furthermore, as was the case with our Dream, the director, designer, cast, and crew 
might be prosecuted and punished. 	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As demonstrated by the detailed account of Hakak, the Iranian state’s position towards 
art is somewhat different from that of Egypt. The Iranian state monitors every move, 
every notion and utterance. The artists are not necessarily in agreement with the state 
over what moral code they should be obliged to adhere to. The Egyptian state, 
however, leaves room for some creative freedom, while maintaining the wider 
framework of public morality or the common public reason, which the artists have 
come to view as part of their society’s inherent nature. 	  
The Iranian state’s position on film contributes to a trend of opposition and a 
consolidation of the artists’ position. In a 2008 news article on opposition to 
censorship in Iran, author Anna Fifield tells the story of the film Santouri, which 
revolves around a musician who struggles to obtain a permit to perform in public. The 
film itself is also banned from public viewing, and in disapproval, Iranians “are 
snapping up copies of the film from bootleg DVD sellers around the country.”134 The 
state authorities’ position is made clear through a statement by Javad Shamghadri, the 
arts advisor to the president, who he publicly condemned the movie, and implied that 
it is part of a wider problem in Iran's film industry.135 The author adds that, in early 
2008, Shamghadri told reporters that “Even changing the train cannot solve the 
Iranian movie industry problem; we should change the railways."136	  
Censorship has strikingly worsened under President Mahmoud Ahmadi-
Nejad's government, as Dariush Mehrjui, the film’s director states that, "Things have 
become very bad in the last two years, not only in the realm of cinema, but in theatre 
and music and publishing too."137 According to the author, orchestral and theater 
performances are increasingly rare, and in the same year, the government banned nine 
magazines because they contained too many photos of "corrupt" Hollywood stars and 
details about their "decadent" private lives. Mona Zandi-Haghighi, a young Iranian 
filmmaker, talks about the grim atmosphere that surrounds the filmmaking industry in 
Iran, saying that "as a filmmaker, I have a lot of difficulties to get the facilities I need 
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to make my films… There is no basic support for filmmakers here. That is the 
difference between making films in Iran and in America."138	  
In the Iranian model, this dominance of the state and the overbearing 
institutions lead to a strong opposition and a consolidated stance from artists and 
filmmakers. The state is strongly and straightforwardly opposed to the film industry 
and offers it no support — on the contrary, it is a sturdy hindrance to its survival, and 
the industry strives to exist in spite of the state. This dynamic leads to a polarity that 
does not exist in the Egyptian model, where opposition is diluted and exists only 
insofar as the extremity of censorship goes, but does not battle the concept itself. The 
difference lies in the power elements manifesting in either model. The Iranian one is 
that of dominance, while the Egyptian one, as explained in an earlier section, is one of 
governmentality, and hence allows for its own ideas to reflect through its subjects, 
which includes artists, intellectuals and filmmakers. This changes the outcome in 
terms of societal change — the former dynamic is an inducer for change, and a 
strengthened battle against the institutions of censorship and the freedoms to be 
afforded to art, even if so far it has been unsuccessful. The latter maintains and 
preserves the status quo and recycles its ideas through the artists themselves, hence 
protecting the permanence of the moral framework that allows for censorship. 
The US model offered an example of a liberal society in which the individual 
takes priority over the collective; a dynamic that does not allow for the forms of 
censorship that exist in Iran or Egypt. The comparison is not necessarily acclaiming 
the American model, but is merely a vital demonstration of a different outcome to the 
Egyptian dynamic where the state does not promote a specific conception of morality 
and values individualistic moral choices over collective ones. These two comparisons 
provide two contrasting ends of the spectrum, one of total domination and aversion 
and another of the state offering its citizen almost absolute moral freedom which both 
differ from the bio power model of the Egyptian state demonstrated throughout the 
thesis.  	  
V. Conclusion 	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In this thesis, I attempt to describe a dynamic that rotates between the state and its 
citizens and contributes to the creation of their subjectivity. The freezing of a moral 
dynamic, that began in the 1970s with a constitutional makeup that intended and was 
successful in making a certain moral and religious ideal permanent and permeate 
throughout Egyptian society, is described through film censorship. A dynamic that 
kept the artists and intellectuals, along with the public, holding on to a moral 
archetype that needs to be protected by the state, where all else is deemed as irregular 
and un-Egyptian. 	  
The concept of censorship over ideas, and the state being a moral agent, has 
only been recently challenged, and still done within limits that resonate with the 
bigger moral framework that is supposedly that of Egyptian society. This dynamic 
described through the model of film censorship extends to other areas, such religious 
freedoms or sexuality. The content that is deemed as obscene, offensive or 
problematic is usually a mirror of, not only what Egyptians do not wish to see on 
screen, but what they do not wish to encounter in their daily lives. 	  
When the state is accepted as a moral agent that dictates and strives to 
maintain the public’s own ideas about itself (mostly voiced by the majority), those 
who fall outside of said ideas are unprotected and are deemed as obscene, offensive 
and problematic. The 1975 case on Bahai’s demonstrates this dynamic and, more 
recently, crackdowns on atheists and homosexuals are illustrative of that moral 
framework, which only endeavors to protect the majority. 	  
In a recent televised phone interview in March 2014, the head of Alexandria 
Security Directorate declared	  that	  a	  taskforce will be formed, which consists of 
police officers specialized in working on such "crimes," and who will be tasked with 
arresting atheists who announce their beliefs on social media websites, calling them 
destructive and foreign ideas.139 Four men who were arrested in their flat in Cairo 
were sentenced to eight years in prison for committing “debauchery”140in April 2014, 
the law’s term for homosexual practices. In a separate incident, 14 men were arrested 
in a medical center in Cairo for practicing homosexuality earlier in October 2013.141 	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These incidents display continuity in the rationale of a preserved and permanent 
Egyptian morality that is mirrored through what is accepted in film and art. This moral 
fabric that is imagined and kept permanent by the state and its subjects will aid the 
justified violation not only of rights dealing with freedom of expression and creativity, 
but also of rights that pertain to taboos such as sex, religion and politics. 	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	   	  
	  	   56	  
APPENDIX	  I:	  Arabic	  Original	  of	  the	  Case	  of	  Darb	  Al	  Hawa	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  	   57	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   58	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   59	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   60	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   61	  
	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   62	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   63	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   64	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   65	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   66	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   67	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   68	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   69	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  
	  	   70	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   71	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   72	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   73	  
	  
